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The development of the SMME sector is critical to general economic development in South 
Africa. Financial constraints are often cited amongst the leading factors hindering progress. 
Financial institutions are often reluctant to lend to smaller entrepreneurs due to perceived 
information asymmetry and lack of available collateral. At the nascent and new entrepreneurial 
levels, it is generally more difficult for loan applicants to provide the information required to 
secure the necessary funds. Inadequate financial information coupled with uninformative 
credit histories heighten the information opacity thus diminishing the entrepreneur’s 
prospects of securing loan funding. Viable entrepreneurial projects may therefore remain 
unfunded largely due to uncertainty rather than riskiness. This study therefore highlights the 
creditworthiness assessment process and seeks to address the information opacity problem 
by looking to alternative sources of entrepreneurial information that may aid the loan officer. 
 
Recent investigations in the field of Behavioural Finance have addressed several aspects of 
entrepreneurial behaviour and decision making. Insights into entrepreneurial risk propensity 
and the impact of certain specific cognitive biases and heuristics have developed. These 
insights may be of particular usefulness to financial institutions that are currently relying on 
insufficient or uninformative creditworthiness information. However, these alternative 
creditworthiness insights have not been sufficiently explored, particularly in South Africa. In 
addition, Behavioural Finance insights have not been adequately investigated within the 
context of entrepreneurial lending. This study both proposes and then investigates the 
usefulness of alternative forms of creditworthiness information – primarily Behavioural 
Finance insights. Fifty SMME loan applicants answered several internet based business case 
studies as part of a loan application process. The presence of cognitive biases and heuristics 
amongst the entrepreneurs that emerged were then correlated against currently available 
creditworthiness information. Entrepreneurs that were found to be more risky based on this 
externally available creditworthiness information were often also found to exhibit a tendency 
to irrational decision making. The study also demonstrated that Behavioural Finance insights 
that are useful to the creditworthiness assessment process can be generated in a 
commercially viable manner. In addition, marked differences in the tendency to rational 
decision making were identified when comparing nascent to more established entrepreneurs. 
This finding emphasizes the importance of segregating the applicant data pools. Effective 
assessment of entrepreneurial decision making is best achieved when contrasted against 
information derived from comparable entrepreneurial sources. The findings serve to advance 
both Behavioural Finance and Banking theory. In addition, through the origination and 
exploration of Behavioural Finance insights in the creditworthiness assessment process, a 
practically useful commercial methodology has been brought to the fore than offers promise 
















1.1 A background to the current SMME finance debate 
 
The development of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) in the South 
African economy is vital as a vehicle for stimulating GDP growth, job creation and 
skills development. To address this, an increase in the supply of financial and non-
financial support was earmarked as a critical strategic objective (White Paper on 
national strategy towards the development and promotion of small business in South 
Africa, (1995); and the National Small Business Act (1996)) and the results 
monitored. However, the response from the ‘big four’ banks were generally found to 
be inadequate (Schoombee, 2000), which is telling as they account for over 90% of 
lending to South African businesses (Okeahalam, 2001). 
 
 
The reasons for the limited success in extending and growing credit services in the 
SMME sector are subject to diverse and opposed explanations. The consensus 
amongst banks is the lack of financial and managerial skills (Schoombee, 2004; 
Global Entrepreneurial Monitor (GEM), 2003) as well as unclear business plans 
(Berry, von Blottnitz, Cassim, Kesper, Rajaratnam, van Seventer; 2002). In 
corroboration, an estimated 50% of start-up businesses fail in the first years of 
trading (Ladzani and van Vuuren, 2002). Moreover, Brink, Cant and Ligthelm (2003) 
maintain that between 70% and 80% of small businesses ultimately fail. By way of 
contrast, many argue that finance supply is insufficient in quantity, unfairly allocated, 
overly costly and linked to unattainable conditions, notably collateral requirements 
(Turner, Varghese, Walker; 2008). A survey of Gauteng based entrepreneurs 
revealed that around 50% had difficulty in obtaining finance or credit (Ligthelm and 
Cant (2003)).  
 
Several recently published research papers have investigated the impact of 












studies in Mexico (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008) and Sri Lanka (de Mel, McKenzie 
and Woodruff, 2008), where small loans were granted to randomized 
microenterprises and high returns on capital were yielded, further emphasised the 
positive impact that can be made. Research efforts have branched out to positing 
methods to increase SMME access to finance. Suggestions include the promotion of 
an enabling environment, large scale downsizing of application efforts and a 
methodology to facilitate the creation of SME credit histories (Nenova, Thiora Niang, 
Ahmad; 2009), as well as a rethinking of the manner in which loan guarantee funding 
and monitoring methodologies are performed (Maroshegyi, Gyula Nagy; 2010). de 
Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2011) found that a relaxation in the financial 
institution’s application requirements could positively increase both the demand and 
supply of finance to SMMEs. 
 
The determination of creditworthiness is challenging to both lenders and borrowers. 
In essence, the lender must be able to assess if an SMME loan applicant has the 
ability to efficiently repay the loan utilising the profits of the business. This 
assessment takes place in an SMME market, which is generally characterised by 
inexperience and limited in financial ability (Olawale and Van Aardt Smit (2010)). 
Consequently, the lending technologies applied in a traditional lending environment 
may not be appropriate and specific lending technologies should be assessed. 
 
 
1.2 Current bank lending technologies 
 
Lenders seek cost effective assessment technologies that can assimilate information 
on loan applicants to correctly assess creditworthiness, reduce the incidence of 
incorrect credit rationing, lower borrower and lender transaction costs, and manage 
loan default rates to ensure financial viability (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). Berger and 
Udell (2006) set out the lending technologies used by financial institutions to assess 
a loan applicant. Among them, and most relevant to this research are Financial 
Statement Lending, Small Business Credit Scoring (‘SBCS’) and Relationship 














Financial Statement Lending 
Financial statement lending is based primarily on the strength of the applicant’s 
financial statements. This methodology incorporates a due diligence and ratio 
analysis to varying extents. Recent findings suggest that large banks tend to base 
their lending decisions more on ‘hard’ financial ratios than prior relationships (Cole, 
Goldberg and White, 2004).  
 
Small Business Credit Scoring 
Small Business Credit Scoring (‘SBCS’) is based primarily on hard information about 
the SME owner and the firm. It involves an analysis of consumer data about the 
owner (typically gleaned off reports from consumer and commercial credit bureaus) 
combined with relatively limited data about the firm itself. The probability that the 
applicant will default or become delinquent is measured. These details are loaded 
into a loan performance prediction model which yields a score based upon which the 
loan will be considered. This technology is generally associated with smaller, 
relatively risky loans i.e. loans with a higher probability of not being repaid due to 
inadequate generation of cash flows. 
 
Relationship Lending 
Relationship Lending relies primarily on ‘soft’ information gathered over time. The 
lender has direct contact with the firm and observes its performance at several 
levels. Small banks seem to tackle the opacity problem using relationship lending 
based on ‘soft’ qualitative information gathered through contact over time with the 
firm, and often with its owners and managers. It allows informationally opaque small 
businesses that do not have strong financial ratios, collateral or credit scores to 
obtain bank financing by augmenting the weaker ‘hard’ information with ‘soft’ 
information learned by the bank over time (Berger and Udell, 2002). 
 
Collateral Demands 
Where the bank cannot arrive at a creditworthiness decision by screening the firms 
or projects to be financed utilizing the available lending technologies at a viable cost, 
banks will almost inevitably resort to collateral. 60% of small business loan value in 












[as cited by Cole, Goldberg and White, 2004]). The proportion is even higher in 
developing economies (Manove, Padilla and Pagano; 2001). 
 
 
1.3 Shortcomings of the current bank lending technologies 
 
Financial Statement Lending 
Financial Statement Lending can only be utilized for relatively transparent entities i.e. 
companies that are able to accurately disclose their results in a manner that 
conforms to generally accepted practice. Finscope 2006 findings (presented by the 
Finmark Trust) reveal that between 8% of Business Sophistication Measure (‘BSM’) 
1 firms and 93% of BSM 7 firms keep some form of financial records. Common 
departures from recommended practice include lack of reporting detail, non-
compliance with IFRS, irregular reporting of results and submission of unaudited 
annual financial statements. This information is in turn compromised by the SME 
borrower’s tendency to skew the information presented to better portray the financial 
situation (von Blottnitz; 2009). Indeed, financial institutions are more likely to lend to 
SME owners who can demonstrate superior financial control and reporting 
(McMahon; 1998a). The ability to provide accurate, reliable and timely financial 
information, while commendable, is not necessarily an indicator of the firm’s 
prospects of repaying the loan. Higher accounting sophistication was found to have 
little impact on the loan officer’s credit assessment process though it did impact on 
the cost of the loan (Cassar, Ittner, Cavalluzzo, 2010). 
 
Small Business Credit Scoring 
The generation of an informative credit score is dependent on the gathering of 
relevant historical information about the applicant. The lack of credit history of many 
applicants may prove a hindrance since many young or new entrants into the credit 
market will have little data with which an accurate credit score can be compiled. Less 
than fifty percent of the South African adult population have an active credit file with 
banks and providers of retail credit (National Credit Register, 2010). This is 
particularly true of black applicants, many of whom were less likely to successfully 
access credit in the apartheid period (Schreiner, Graham, Cortes-Fontcuberta, 












system is also dependent on the care with which it is developed and maintained. If 
the applicant pool increases the bank must ensure that the new pool of applicants 
behaves similarly to the pool on which the scoring model was built. If not, the failure 
prediction capabilities will be less reliable. This may be particularly true of the South 
African credit market where the credit histories of many new entrants in a post-
apartheid emerging economic climate differ from borrowers of the past both in terms 
of quantity of information and spending patterns. Shifts in the economic climate must 
also be factored into a successful scoring model. The recent recessionary climate 
has exacerbated the incidence of loan defaults making comparative analysis difficult. 
Furthermore, where little relevant information is available on large groups of people, 
it is inevitable that individuals within these groups will be denied access to credit until 
more information can be gathered on the group as a whole. 
  
Overreliance on SBCS may result in the possibility of banks abandoning other 
evaluation tools that yield alternate credit data – this may result in an exacerbation of 
the opacity problem. Where SBCS is the primary lending technology, it is likely that 




Lending constraints should theoretically diminish as the bank – borrower relationship 
matures and the level of information opacity decreases. Collateral requirements are 
lessened when the bank is able to reduce the information gap between lender and 
borrower (Berger, Espinosa, Frame and Miller, 2007) though Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000) had previously found the decrease to be marginal. It is considerably 
difficult to transmit this soft information about the firm through the various 
management layers or to pass it on to succeeding loan officers (Berger and Udell, 
2002). Where the length of the bank – borrower relationship is brief, the difficulty in 
integrating the soft information is exacerbated making collateral demands more 
indispensable to the bank. 
 
Collateral Demands 
The normative balance should be one where banks use collateral to correct moral 












are known to be relatively more constrained by collateral requirements (Lewis, 2002; 
Bigsten et al, 2003). Since the neediest SMMEs are in fact smaller and newer (Trade 
and Industrial Policy Strategies; 2002) and thus beginning their relationship with the 
bank, it is unlikely that dependence on collateral will decrease, all other factors being 
equal. This dependence results in banks becoming less motivated to evaluate the 
profitability of projects, rather resting on high collateral levels. This is unfortunate 
given the bank’s high levels of experience in many sectors and markets. They may 
be more familiar with aspects of a venture than the firm owners who often 
overestimate the profitability of their own projects (De Meza and Southey; 1996). 
Consequences of collateral policies are that collateral is posted by the wealthier 
entrepreneurs resulting in funding of their good and bad projects. Screening would 
separate the riskiness of the borrowers from the quality of their projects. The effect of 
over-reliance on collateral is over-funding of projects that are not worthwhile due to 
under-screening of investments (Manove et al; 2001), while simultaneously 
overlooking potentially worthwhile projects due to unfamiliarity with a significant 
portion of the market. 
 
 
1.4. Lending technologies and the increase in credit supply 
 
1.4.1. Advances in creditworthiness lending technology 
 
It is not clear which of the three lending technologies (Relationship based lending, 
Financial statement lending and Small Business Credit Scoring) discussed in this 
research undertaking would be best suited to achieve the goal of increasing the 
supply of SMME finance. The major constraints to lending include: 
 the information opacity obscuring a definitive view of the borrower’s financial 
position (hindering financial statement lending),  
 the lack of new entrants’ credit history (hindering SBCS), and  
 the lack of prior exposure to new entrepreneurs (hindering relationship 
lending). 
Despite these difficult circumstances, for the bank to increase the flow of funding to 












entrepreneurs that exhibit creditworthy traits from those that don’t. A number of 
recent studies have investigated more effective methodologies to decide on 
creditworthiness using the existing data available (e.g. Yu, Wang and Lai, 2009; 
Abdou, 2009) as well as the usage of alternate forms of information in the 
creditworthiness assessment process. The use of psychometric testing tools as part 
of the screening process has emerged to a limited extent over the past year (Winter, 
2010). Finlay (2010) demonstrated that models that include continuous financial 
behaviour i.e. factoring in information about the lenders prior decision making 
criteria, consistently outperform models based only on classification approaches 
(binary classifications such as good payer / bad payer). Sohn and Jeon (2010) 
proposed an alternative risk model to predict default particularly in technology firms 
based on a combination of insolvent debtor and insolvent company default criteria. 
In searching for alternative sources of information on creditworthiness, Cassar et 
al’s (2010) study found that firm age and legal liability impacted the loan decision 
within the context of the other information that was available to the loan officer. 
 
1.4.2 Creditworthiness uncertainty 
 
The positive developments mentioned have contributed to the creditworthiness 
assessment process, but further SMME entrepreneurial specific insights are needed, 
particularly if they can directly support the existing lending technologies to 
circumvent the uncertainty remaining when screening newer entrepreneurs. 
Uncertainty in this context is defined as lack of knowledge for decision making 
(Duncan, 1972). Alternative sources of information that can reduce the uncertainty 
that pervades the creditworthiness assessment will be analysed, proposed and then 
investigated. Specifically these will be analysed within the three most prominently 
used lending technology categories i.e. 
 SBCS: Additional (novel) creditworthiness insights will assist with the 
differentiation of more and less creditworthy entrepreneurs. 
 Financial statement lending: Applicants with a lower financial sophistication 
level may be less creditworthy loan applicants. 
 Relationship based lending: Applicants that are less willing to post collateral 













1.5. Objectives of the study 
 
In South Africa, research has been done on many aspects within lending. These 
include but are not limited to studies on the existence (or not) of a credit mismatch 
(for example von Blottnitz, 2009; Rankhumise and Rugimbana, 2010), forms of 
finance available and responses to the mismatch (for example Schoombee, 2000 
and Schoombee, 2004), causes of the unfulfilled demand (for example Olawale and 
Van Aardt Smit, 2010) and lending approaches (for example Pretorius and Shaw, 
2004). With regard to the SMME entrepreneur, many studies have been done on the 
status of entrepreneurial activity in South Africa (for example GEM, 2002; GEM, 
2003), the various weaknesses that proliferate within the entrepreneurial population 
(for example GEM, 2005; GEM, 2007), the extent of business failure (for example 
Brink, Cant and Ligthelm, 2003; Ladzani and van Vuuren, 2002; Liedholm, 2001) and 
the causes of those failings (for example Ligthelm and Cant, 2003). However, there 
is an absence of creative research on South African specific bank lending 
technologies. In addition, little research has been done on the behavioural 
characteristics of South African entrepreneurs. Importantly, few published studies 
(none in South Africa) were found that bind these seemingly intertwined fields. Yet it 
would seem that the entrepreneurial character of the loan applicant would be of 
considerable interest to the loan officer. Specifically, an understanding of the 
cognitive biases and heuristics that form part of the entrepreneurial process has not 
been linked to the financial institution’s creditworthiness decision. 
 
The study seeks to explore the viability of alternative, primarily behavioural finance 
based sources of creditworthiness information when assessing loan applications in 
the nascent and new entrepreneurial SMME sector. Each of the most prominently 
used lending technologies will be addressed separately. 
 
Financial Statement Lending  
Entrepreneurs may understand and effectively incorporate financial information into 
their business decision making process despite being unable to meet the complex 
financial demands set by financial institutions. An analysis of the regularity with 












together with their understanding of basic financial concepts is proposed as a 
supplement to traditional financial statement lending. In addition, insights into the 
willingness with which entrepreneur’s provide information may further clarify the 
perception that non provision of financial information is a signal of credit risk. 
 
Small Business Credit Scoring 
Perry (2008) found that consumers with higher levels of financial knowledge and who 
also believe that their actions will produce predictable outcomes (internal locus of 
control) generally had higher credit scores. Slavec and Prodan (2009) found that 
entrepreneurs who exhibited self efficacy stood a greater chance of securing trade 
credit. An analysis of the extent to which entrepreneurs are influenced by cognitive 
biases and heuristics in the decision making process is thus proposed as a 
supplement to SBCS. 
 
Relationship Based Lending 
The phenomenon of discouraged borrowers is one where good businesses that 
require funding from banks choose not to apply because they feel that they will fall 
short on the collateral or other requirements and their loans will be rejected. 
Relevant to the South African SMME context, this was shown to occur most often 
where there was some, but not perfect information i.e. a level of information 
asymmetry (Kon, Storey, 2003). The entrepreneur must be willing to post collateral in 
the instance that the loan application is accepted. An analysis of the level of dread 
with which entrepreneur’s respond to collateral demands is proposed as a 
supplement to traditional relationship lending and the provision of collateral. 
 
 
The thesis progresses as follows: 
 Chapter 2 describes entrepreneurs within a Behavioural Finance context. The 
case for utilising Behavioural Finance insights as an additional bank 
technology tool is presented. The cognitive biases and heuristics most 












 Chapter 3 sets out the methodology with which the research project was 
undertaken. The usage of an internet questionnaire is described and the 
measurement variables defined. The hypotheses are then developed. 
 Chapter 4 presents the results of the questionnaire responses. Each of the 
cognitive biases is analysed within the context of the three lending 
technologies. 
 Chapter 5 presents a summary of  the major findings and their potential 
implications for future creditworthiness assessments. The limitations are 
discussed and areas where future research would be valuable are identified. 
 
 
The overall chapter layout is presented in Figure 1.1. This figure will be repeated at 
the onset of each chapter to contextualize the content as the thesis develops. 
 




INTRODUCTION: CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND BANK 
LENDING TECHNOLOGIES
(The current mismatch, the bank technologies 
currently in use and their shortcomings, the potential 
for alternative screening technologies)
CHAPTER 2:
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE INSIGHTS IN THE 
CREDITWORTHINESS ASSESSMANT PROCESS
(Prior Behavioural Finance research within an SMME 
context, rational behaviour and creditworthiness, 
specific cognitive biases and heuristics)
CHAPTER 3:
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
(Internet hosted questionnaire, measurement 
variables, hypotheses)
CHAPTER 4:
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics 
as a means to support the current bank lending 
technologies, findings of the hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence
 - Composite Score
CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS













Chapter 2 – Behavioural Finance insights in the 





Several important entrepreneur specific variables that do not yet form part of the 
widely utilized, formal creditworthiness assessment process are presented. 
Behavioural Finance insights are introduced in this context, given the significance 
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION: CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND BANK LENDING 
TECHNOLOGIES
(The current mismatch, the bank technologies currently in use and their 
shortcomings, the potential for alternative screening technologies)
CHAPTER 2:
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE INSIGHTS IN THE CREDITWORTHINESS 
ASSESSMANT PROCESS
(Prior Behavioural Finance research within an SMME context, rational 




(Internet hosted questionnaire, measurement variables, hypotheses)
CHAPTER 4:
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence
 - Composite Score
CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS












and influence of cognitive biases and heuristics in the SMME management process. 
Those cognitive biases and heuristics that are most likely to affect an entrepreneur’s 
predisposition to risk taking are described. Previous research; specifically recent 
empirical studies on these cognitive biases and heuristics is presented. It is then 
suggested that evidence of chronic influence by one or more of these biases and 
heuristics would be a useful insight in the creditworthiness assessment process. 
 
 
2.2 An alternative creditworthiness technology 
 
Having identified the mismatch between the demand and supply of credit in the 
SMME sector and the possible inefficiencies in the screening process, other 
variables will be described that have not been formally considered within the 
creditworthiness assessment process in the past. 
 
2.2.1 The missing creditworthiness variables 
 
Building on previous research characterising attributes of successful entrepreneurs, 
Buttner and Rosen (1988) asked bank loan officers to rate each of nine dimensions 
in terms of their interrelatedness to successful entrepreneurship. Included in these 
dimensions were, amongst others, leadership skills, persuasiveness, lack of 
emotionalism, low need for support and moderate risk taking propensity (defined by 
Sitkin and Pablo (1992) as the tendency of a decision maker to either take or avoid 
risks). It is noteworthy that when screening for loans, none of these nine, or 
alternative combinations of entrepreneurial or cognitive traits and learned skills are 
formally evaluated1. Entrepreneur specific factors that may be considered include 
several owner specific factors such as management experience, skills and past 
training (Pretorius and Shaw, 2004). 
 
South African banks have described SMME entrepreneurs as lacking in 
management skills (Schoombee, 2004). It seems evident that the traditional bank 
lending technologies are not sufficiently able to differentiate between entrepreneurs 
                                                 












that are creditworthy (particularly the nascent kind) and entrepreneurs that aren’t in a 
cost effective manner – hence the reliance on collateral based lending (Manove, 
Padilla and Pagano, 2001). Loan officers have developed models of favourable 
entrepreneurial candidates for credit incorporating specific skills and characteristics, 
and the current lending technologies are not specifically designed to reveal evidence 
of these merits, the presence of which can guide the lending decision.  
 
Financial management skills 
A survey of Gauteng based entrepreneurs (Ligthelm and Cant (2003)) revealed that 
of the endogenous (firm based) factors, marketing related issues followed by 
financial management issues were seen to impact most negatively on the success of 
businesses. The 2007 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor report found the most 
significant factors hampering the effective development of entrepreneurship in South 
Africa to be lack of business knowledge and self confidence. The inability to supply 
financial information is seen as an important constraint to the granting of credit from 
a supply side. Cole et al (2004) found that large banks will be more likely to extend 
credit to small firms who can demonstrate the following: 
 The firm keeps formal financial records 
 The firm is larger than other firms competing for the same loan 
 The firm has a longer track record 
 The firm has greater cash reserves 
 The firm is not excessively leveraged 
 The owner can demonstrate a positive credit history 
Often, small firms are not able to demonstrate their financial status accurately or 
completely. However, SMME entrepreneurs may have deliberately chosen not to 
produce all of the required financial information. McMahon (1998b) cites several 
reasons that explain the departures from financial institution reporting requirements. 
These include the following: 
 The SMME owner is not always a rational economic decision maker and relies 
on intuition and alertness to opportunities. Since the owner does not look to 
financial information as part of the decision making process, the mechanisms 












 The circumstances of the business are not so demanding as to require 
extensive financial reporting. 
 The cost of preparing the information is not insignificant whether it is prepared 
internally or outsourced to accountants or consultants. The owner believes 
that the costs of being better informed of the financial consequences of 
management decisions outweigh the benefits. 
 The direct benefits are seen as intangible until such time as pressing 
economic circumstances beget a need for additional financial reporting. 
Information will only be prepared intermittently and usually when called for by 
external parties such as financial institutions or regulatory authorities. 
 The owner believes that financial statements do not provide sufficiently 
reliable information; perhaps due to historical cost conventions. Since the 
owner does not trust the information, the mechanisms in place to prepare it 
will not be sufficient. This belief may manifest further as new Companies Act 
(2008) legislation removes the mandatory audit requirement for non-publicly 
accountable entities. 
 The owner believes that financial statements do not provide management with 
the primary information needed for decision making purposes. The ideal 
requirements will often be prohibitively expensive and will, negate the need for 
other financial reports. 
 
Nevertheless, the non-provision of financial information generally serves as a signal 
to the bank that the entrepreneur is a risky candidate. The impetus of the 
entrepreneur behind not supplying the required financial information is generally not 
considered. Where the SMME entrepreneur lacks the necessary resources or 
motivation to provide all of the required information or is starting up and does not 
have the financial history to report, the bank must look to evidence from other 
sources. An assessment of the candidate’s commercial numeracy skills and the 
extent of the applicant’s usage of financial information will be two of the variables 















Small Business Credit Scoring 
The SBCS model developed in 1995 by Fair Isaac, a leading risk management 
company, found that the most important indicators of small business loan 
performance were characteristics of the business owner rather than the business 
itself i.e. the owner’s credit history was more predictive than the profitability or net 
worth of the business (Mester, 1997). Thus, the applicant’s SBCS should provide a 
signal to the bank of the entrepreneur’s propensity to rational decision making. 
Where the SMME entrepreneur lacks the necessary credit history through which a 
meaningful credit score can be established, alternative creditworthiness 
methodologies must be found and utilized. An assessment of the entrepreneur’s 
propensity to irrational decision making through the cognitive biases and heuristics 
that manifest in the management decision making process will provide evidence of 
the entrepreneur’s predisposition to excessive risk taking. 
 
Relationship Based Lending 
Past research findings differ as to the extent of the impact of the length of the bank 
borrower relationship on the bank’s collateral demands (Berger, Espinosa et al, 
2007; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). While the collateral serves as a catalyst to 
the positing of collateral, it confines lending to a wealthier borrower pool and does 
little to reduce the uncertainty behind the borrower’s creditworthiness. The motivation 
behind the entrepreneur’s decision to post collateral has been largely ignored. An 
assessment of the entrepreneur’s willingness to post collateral together with the 
availability of collateral may provide evidence as to short-sightedness of the ‘lazy 
bank’ (Manove et al; 2001) phenomenon of lending solely on the basis of collateral. 
 
It is these alternatives that will be explored. The possibility of determining propensity 
to irrational decision making in a creditworthiness decision through behavioural 
finance theory will be proposed as an enhancement to SBCS. Knowledge of 
commercial numeracy skills and extent of usage of financial information will be 
proposed as an enhancement to financial statement lending. Availability and 
willingness to post collateral will be posited as enhancements to relationship based 
lending. Since cognitive biases can evolve over time (Hasselton and Nettle, 2006), it 
is anticipated that the behavioural decision making processes exhibited by more 












emerging from the behavioural finance and other creditworthiness analyses will 
therefore contrast nascent entrepreneurs from those of established entrepreneurs. 
 
 
2.3. Background to Behavioural Finance research 
 
Behavioural finance introduces the possibility that financial decision makers are less 
than fully rational and employ heuristics and certain systematic cognitive biases. At 
this point it is important to define decision making heuristics as simple and 
approximate rules, guiding procedures, shortcuts and strategies that are used to 
solve problems (Buchanan and Huczynski, 2004). They act as filtering and 
organizing devices which simplify and thus speed the decision process. Heuristics 
have also been associated with faster learning and innovative behaviour (Buchanan 
and Huczynski, 2004) in terms of their ability to yield insights into unresolved issues. 
They can also result in decision errors due to the nature of the shortcuts and biases 
exhibited. Cognitive biases can be defined as prejudiced predispositions or a 
systematic distortion when making a decision. Biases, while helping decision makers 
cope with their cognitive limitations, may result in less rational and less 
comprehensive decision making i.e. deviations from ‘textbook’ financial behaviour. 
Departures from the theories are termed anomalies yet to be resolved. Whereas 
normative Modern Finance Theories provide the theoretical framework for economic 
analyses, explicitly descriptive models of behaviour in markets and organizations are 
being and have been developed. Entrepreneurs are less likely to have access to 
historical trends and other information to analyse and then reduce the level of 
uncertainty behind many business decisions at a relatively low cost. Nor do they 
necessarily place much reliance on many of the financial reports commonly 
produced. They may systematically overestimate the reliability of information at their 
disposal, draw incorrect conclusions and give information too little or too much 
weight. Entrepreneurs’ decisions stem from a wide range of non-business and 
untraditional information (Kaish, Gilad, 1991). Without their willingness and 
confidence to make decisions with the scattered information available, they would 
not be able to manage their companies. Bryant (2007) adds that simple decision 
heuristics enable entrepreneurs to function in dynamic and uncertain environments, 












information. An investigation into this cognitive approach would thus be concerned 
with the entrepreneur’s preferred way of gathering, processing and evaluating 
information. 
 
As Behavioural Finance theory developed, researchers began to focus on 
entrepreneurial decisions. Given the inherent riskiness in starting a venture, 
researchers suggested that entrepreneurs had a lower perception of risk than others 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). It was then argued that this lowered perception of 
risk was caused by the prevalence of cognitive biases (Busenitz and Barney 1997; 
McCarthy, Shoorman and Cooper 1993; Palich and Bagby 1995; Shaver and Scott 
1991). Baron and Ward (2004) extended these findings by stating that cognitive 
factors play a significant part in the entrepreneurial process. These insights have 
fundamentally changed the way we look at how financial decisions are made. Since 
it is human decisions that cause businesses to succeed or fail, much research has 
shifted to the decision making aspects rather than the operational / commercial 
aspects of business management. Recent research reveals that the cognitive 
approach better explains entrepreneurial behaviour and perception. Shaver and 
Scott (pg. 39, 1991) state: 
“Economic circumstances are important; social networks are important; 
entrepreneurial teams are important; marketing is important; finance is important; 
even public agency assistance is important. But none of these will, alone, create a 
new venture. For that we need a person, in whose mind all of the possibilities come 
together, who believes that innovation is possible, and who has the motivation to 
persist until the job is done.” 
 
Many studies have applied specific cognitive biases and heuristics to economic 
activities (several that apply specifically to SMME management are discussed in 
sections 2.6. and 2.7). Cognitive biases are likely to be exhibited in SMMEs than 
larger firms (Forbes, 1999), due to the prevalence of many factors such as 
information overload, high uncertainty, time pressure and considerable ambiguity 
(Baron, 1998). 
 
However, few studies have identified or developed more comprehensive frameworks 
that allow for the modelling of decision processes, particularly around the area of 












Constand (2010) posit that a relationship exists between the probability of venture 
failure and the intensity of the cognitive biases of the individual managing the 
venture. They connect the applicability of the relationship primarily to the realm of 
Venture Capital finance without progressing the research to the development of a 
model or specific approach. In fact, very little research has suggested practical 
methodologies to apply behavioural finance insights to failure prediction or other 
commercial screening processes. 
 
While there is a general consensus as to the necessity of cognitive biases and 
heuristics in the entrepreneurial decision making process, these characteristics also 
point to irrational behaviour that may cause the entity to fail. Screening 
entrepreneurs within a commercial selection process must therefore acknowledge 
that the presence of certain cognitive biases is likely to be found amongst 
entrepreneurs and that the intensity of these biases may be an indicator of failure or 
success. Within this study, a practical application of a theoretical SMME failure 
prediction model will be proposed and then analysed. 
 
 
2.4. Potential usefulness of behavioural finance as a credit assessment tool 
 
An understanding of the cognitive biases and heuristics exhibited by an SMME 
owner may shed further light on the creditworthiness of the individual. Biases and 
traits that lend themselves to a lowered risk perception resulting in more frequent 
and excessive risk taking amongst credit applicants should be of particular interest to 
financial institutions. In South Africa currently, SBCS and collateral demands 
together with an evaluation of the business plan or financial statements are the 
primary forms of risk assessment employed at the SMME level (Botha, 2008; Busse, 
2008). Banks and other lenders focus on the candidate’s financial results and credit 
history and do not necessarily evaluate the propensity of an applicant to engage in 
irrational behaviour. SBCS circumvents screening of the project to a large degree 
and monitoring cost constraints preclude a detailed analysis of the applicant’s 
business plan or financial statements. Any further insights into the viability of the firm 
or project are diminished by the information asymmetry created as a result of the 












applications may be short-sightedly approved or declined, due to the lack of a 
suitable credit history or poor business communication skills. This may happen in 
several instances: 
 The financial institution has gained no certainty regarding the results of the 
SBCS 
 The financial institution has gained no certainty from the information 
contained in the business proposal 
 Collateral has been requested and the applicant is not able to meet the 
collateral demands or unwilling to post the collateral 
Alternatively, imperfect screening may also result in the phenomenon of discouraged 
borrowers. Creditworthy firms may not apply for credit at all rather than face the 
prospect of being rejected (Kon and Storey; 2003).  
 
Were it possible for the financial institution to understand the behavioural inclinations 
of the entrepreneur behind the firm applying for credit, the level of information 
opacity might be somewhat mitigated. Drawing on international literature in 
behavioural economics, Lunn (2011) hypothesized that seven established biases in 
judgment and decision making played a role in the Irish banking crisis (the 
applicability of the crisis to global economies is more broadly hypothesized). Various 
transacting parties were prone to the influence of cognitive biases and heuristics 
including lenders, borrowers, regulators and economists. Lunn suggests that were 
these parties sensitive to the influence of cognitive biases and heuristics within their 
decision making processes, the extent of the credit crisis may have been lessened. 
These conclusions hint at the potential benefits of behavioural finance awareness as 
an alternative source of information in improving the decision making process. A 
practical and somewhat intuitive usage of behavioural finance knowledge is to 
analyse the behavioural factors behinds a decision to avoid making mistakes i.e. 
defensive behavioural finance applications (Fromlet, 2001). Bryant (2007) states that 
since it is possible to identify a person’s chronic self-regulatory characteristics, the 
information could be used by investors to evaluate nascent and practising 
entrepreneurs in terms of their heuristic decision making skills. Yazdipour (2010) 
develops several themes around the practical usage of behavioural finance. He 












to understand each other’s’ views as a means to reduce the perception asymmetry 
between them. No specific model is developed, nor are explicit methodologies 
suggested. However, a strong suggestion for future research is recorded; specifically 
in developing and making a risk equation operational that processes both objective 
and subjective risks and uncertainties around the Venture Capitalist / Entrepreneur 
seed investment decision.  
 
Shepherd (2011) highlighted the usage of multilevel models of decision making on 
entrepreneurial tasks as an important area for future research. In this vein Palich and 
Bagby (1995) state that the demonstration of specific traits by entrepreneurs may be 
useful to third parties interested in assessing natural persons for entrepreneurial 
behaviour. Similarly, If the bank were able to determine the entrepreneurs’ 
propensity to risk taking in conjunction with the mental short-cuts that they employ 
when evaluating the opportunities they intend to pursue, it might be possible to offer 
or decline credit with a greater degree of certainty. 
 
 
2.5. Testing for entrepreneurial traits and skills 
 
When assessing a candidate for the purposes of entering into an agency agreement, 
many different behavioural attributes may be considered desirable. Where a lender 
is assessing a borrower, foremost in the determination of creditworthiness is the 
level of certainty that the lender will be repaid. It is imperative that the owner / 
manager of the business exhibits the traits, skills and behavioural characteristics 
considered important to be a successful entrepreneur. Significant research has been 
done on entrepreneurial traits and learned skills (for example, Sexton and Bowman, 
1985; Sexton and Upton, 1987; Utsch and Rauch; 2000; Baum, Locke and Smith; 
2001) including investigations into self confidence, innovation, energy and good 
communication skills. These traits or skills will influence the manner in which 
entrepreneurs relate to the various stakeholders and the skills they are able to 
harness in the marketplace. Recent creditworthiness experiments at several 
Southern African lending institutions that include psychometric screening tests have 
yielded promising results (Winter, 2010). Depending on the experience and 












traits will be favoured over others. Financial institutions will differ in the lending 
profiles they prefer and while all are important, certain businesses will have a greater 
need for specific traits and skills in their leaders than will others. It may therefore 
become a complex exercise to screen and match the entrepreneurial attributes to 
both the business and the preferences of the lender. Rather than screen for 
entrepreneurial traits and learned skills, it is suggested that screening for behavioural 




2.6. Cognitive Biases and predisposition to risk taking 
 
McMahon (2006) refers to over one hundred highly specific cognitive biases and 
heuristics as cited by Manimala in 1992. For the purposes of this study, only those 
biases that have been investigated in earlier research with particular reference to the 
decision making process of the SME entrepreneur will be discussed. In particular, 
those that have been shown to have an influence on ones predisposition to risk 
taking are currently of interest. There is no worldwide consensus on an exact 
definition for predisposition to risk taking. Read, Song and Smit (2009) recently 
described it as being cognisant of one’s affordable loss i.e. calculating the downside 
potential and not risking more than one can afford. Entrepreneurs are likely to 
evaluate an idea more favourably when they perceive less risk in that idea (Keh, Foo 
and Lim, 2002). Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) explain the phenomenon as being the 
only way entrepreneurial progress can occur. In addition, entrepreneurs are attracted 
to riskier ventures as they do not perceive the inherent riskiness, not because they 
knowingly accept the higher levels of risks (Simon, Houghton and Aquino, 1999). In 
an environment where one in three non-white entrepreneurs (one in five white) start 
businesses because they perceive no other choice for themselves (GEM, 2007), the 
propensity to risk taking is likely to be further increased. In addition, it is extremely 
difficult to eliminate the impact of biases since individuals are generally unaware that 
they are exhibiting them (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
 
Cognitive biases and heuristics form a fundamental underpinning to the success or 












go to evaluate the situations and the prejudices inherent in their decision making 
processes. The rational entrepreneur will analyse the options, reduce the decision 
uncertainty to the extent that is possible given the information available, and then 
decide on a course of action. The lending official is unlikely to verify that the 
entrepreneur’s predisposition to risk taking, core to the decision making process, is 
not excessive. 
 
The lender will price the loan based on the risk of loss that they perceive to be 
inherent in the venture. If the lender realized that the entrepreneur’s predisposition to 
risk taking were excessive and indicated more inherent risk of loss in the project than 
initially determined, the loan might never have been granted or alternatively the loan 
price might need to be adjusted. The focus of this research study will therefore be on 
those cognitive biases that have been found to influence ones predisposition to risk 
taking. 
 
In order to proceed, those cognitive biases and heuristics most likely to influence 
entrepreneurial behaviour must be highlighted. 
 
 
2.7. Previous research on Behavioural Finance in Entrepreneurs 
 
Much of the past descriptive Behavioural Finance research within the entrepreneurial 
realm has reasoned as to the presence of specific biases and heuristics (for example 
De Meza and Southey, 1996; Baron, 1998). Past empirical research has identified 
and explained several of these cognitive biases and heuristics in line with common 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Sample size neglect and overconfidence (Busenitz, 
1999), excessive optimism (Palich and Bagby, 1995), illusion of control (Simon, 
Houghton and Aquino, 1999; Le Roux, Pretorius and Millard, 2006 (South African 
study)), escalation of commitment (McCarthy, Schoorman and Cooper, 1993), 
planning fallacy (Keh, Foo and Lim, 2002), sunk cost fallacy (Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 2000) and endowment effect (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2000) are 
among the cognitive biases that have been empirically found to exist in owners and 
managers of SME firms. Among the common decision making heuristics prevalent in 












Kanto, 1998), representativeness (Busenitz, 1999), and counterfactual thinking 
(Baron, 1999) have been proposed. 
 
Of interest to this research is the manifestation of cognitive biases and heuristics that 
affect the South African SME entrepreneur’s propensity to risk taking and irrational 
decision making. Of particular relevance, therefore, are the cognitive biases and 
heuristics that have been correlated, either directly or indirectly, with lack of aversion 
to risk taking and those that may result in irrational decisions in a small business 
environment. Illusion of control (Keh et al, 2002; Simon et al 1999), lack of 
counterfactual thinking (Baron, 1999) and framing (Kuusela et al, 1998) have been 
correlated with a reduced risk perception or higher propensity to risk taking. Keh et al 
(2002) did not eliminate the possibility of correlating risk perception to planning 
fallacy, though they did not find a significant correlation (likely due to the vagueness 
of the questionnaires employed). Past empirical research has not tested whether 
there is a correlation between escalation of commitment and risk perception. 
McCarthy et al (1993) found that overconfident individuals tend to exhibit the 
escalation of commitment bias and that negative feedback seems to evoke self 
justification. A correlation between the borrower’s excessive optimism bias and a 
lessened perception of risk has been proposed but not yet empirically proven (De 
Meza and Southey, 1996). Entrepreneurs have been found to exhibit overconfidence 
though the overconfidence bias alone cannot be said to heighten risk taking 
behaviour. Overconfidence may cause an entrepreneur to irrationally entrench 
himself in a risk averse or high risk decision. 
 
 
2.8. Description of the relevant biases and heuristics  
 
Based on the prior research presented in 2.6, it seems that the Excessive Optimism, 
Illusions of Control, Planning Fallacy, Overconfidence and Escalation of Commitment 
biases as well as the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking heuristic seem likely to have 
the greatest influence on an entrepreneur’s propensity to risk taking. They are 
therefore likely to be the most relevant to the creditworthiness assessment process 














2.8.1. Excessive Optimism 
 
This bias is exhibited when an individual systematically overestimates the probability 
of a favourable outcome or systematically underestimates the probability of an 
unfavourable outcome. The bias may cause one’s perception of risk to be lower and 
thus obviate the need for taking precautions. De Meza and Southey (1996) 
concluded that entrepreneurs are generally excessively optimistic people. They 
further note that given the extremely high rate of small business failures, it is difficult 
to believe that entrepreneurs have appreciated all of the pitfalls. Cooper, Woo and 
Dunkelberg (1988) found that entrepreneurs rated their chances of success as 
significantly higher than those of similar businesses. Arabsheibani et al (2000) 
further explained that excessive optimism is less evident with more experienced, 
better educated entrepreneurs. However, Palich and Bagby, (1995) concluded that 
entrepreneurs are more likely to frame decisions positively when faced with 
ambiguous information. Using a scenario approach involving 148 entrepreneurs, 
they found that entrepreneurs viewed some situations as opportunities where others 
saw little potential. They did not perceive themselves to have a greater propensity to 
risk taking than non-entrepreneurs, while perceiving less risk in certain of the 
scenarios than the non-entrepreneurs. 
 
2.8.2. Escalation of Commitment 
 
This bias is exhibited when an individual who has made an initial decision, 
recommits to that decision despite negative feedback that indicates the initial 
decision may have been incorrect. The individual then makes further decisions 
biased by the initial commitment, being reluctant to forego the value or effort already 
committed. In a study investigating escalation of commitment in new product 
developments, Schmidt and Calantone (2002) found that giving managers better 
information did not lead to better decision making. Hambrick et al (1993) noted that 
the manifestation of the Escalation of Commitment bias increases when decision 
makers have worked within the company or industry for a lengthy duration. McCarthy 
et al (1993), in a research investigation involving 1,112 companies, found that 












the decision to expand and that these tendencies to Escalation of Commitment were 
more likely when market feedback was negative. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2000), 
in a study involving 59 future family businesses leaders, found that entrepreneurs 
exhibiting a greater endowment effect were more likely to invest in projects with a 
greater risk of financial loss. 
 
2.8.3. Lack of Counterfactual Thinking 
 
The Counterfactual Thinking heuristic is exhibited where the entrepreneur tends to 
dwell on past events, imagining how circumstances would be different today if 
different courses of action had been taken. Engaging in counterfactual thinking can 
have positive benefits. The process of imagining alternative outcomes can lead to 
useful insights into the factors that lead to the actual outcomes. This in turn can lead 
to better decision making in the future. Lack of counterfactual thinking precludes this 
learning experience. Research (e.g. Roese, 1997) points to the understanding that 
engaging in counterfactual thinking has a net positive benefit especially in situations 
that are to some extent controllable and likely to repeat in the future. Cassar and 
Craig (2009) find the presence of hindsight bias (the inability to accurately recall past 
experiences) in all but the most formally educated nascent entrepreneurs. In a study 
of counterfactual thinking and the negotiation process it was found that the presence 
of upward counterfactual thinking (comparing the current reality to a more ideal 
situation) appears to motivate individuals to avoid the possibility of future regret by 
taking protective measures to prevent its reoccurrence and that counterfactual 
thinking increases the amount of preparative time spent (Galinsky, Seiden, Kim and 
Medvec; 2002). In an empirical test involving 44 entrepreneurs, 26 aspiring 
entrepreneurs and 32 non-entrepreneurs, Baron (1999) found that the entrepreneurs 
were significantly less likely than the other groups to engage in counterfactual 
thinking. Baron concluded that where engaging in counterfactual thinking may cause 
individuals to perceive situations in less favourable (e.g. riskier) terms, its lack may 


















The Overconfidence bias is exhibited where individuals overestimate and then stand 
by the correctness of their estimates when answering difficult questions or dealing 
with unclear decisions. They may not be aware of the limits of their knowledge and 
may therefore treat their assumptions as facts with no possibility of error. Busenitz 
and Barney (1997) found that entrepreneurs are more overconfident during their 
decision making processes than are managers of businesses. They explain that 
decisions might never be made were this not the case given the information 
constraints at a smaller business level. Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) found 
amongst venture capitalists that overconfidence negatively affected decision 
accuracy. The level of overconfidence depended upon the amount and type of 
information. The more information received, the more these individuals tended to 
believe that they were making a ‘more informed decision’. The outcome of their 
findings is that the greater their confidence (influenced by the amount and type of 
information they had), the less accurate were the venture capitalists decisions. In a 
study involving 191 MBA students, Simon et al (1999) found that overconfidence did 
not lower (or increase) risk perception. Individuals may have a great belief in the 
accuracy of their assumptions, but those assumptions may not always lead to 
optimistic conclusions. That is, an entrepreneur may be convinced of the accuracy of 
their belief that an opportunity will fail. 
 
2.8.5. Illusions of Control 
 
The illusion of control bias is exhibited in cases where an individual overemphasises 
the extent to which their skill can increase the outcome in situations where chance or 
uncontrollable external variables are the deciding factors. In a series of gambling 
experiments, Koehler, Gibbs and Hogarth (1994) found that illusion of control was 
more commonly exhibited in single shot (once off) gambles, but less so in multi shot 
gambles. This implies that once people become more familiar with the underlying 
randomness of the outcomes, they become less deluded as to the impact their skills 
have on the outcome. Simon et al (1999) utilising a teaching case and 191 MBA 
students, found that individuals who laboured under an illusion of control bias had a 












starting ventures might not acknowledge that certain variables, crucial to the 
venture’s success, are beyond their control. Le Roux et al (2006) found a negative 
correlation between the Illusion of Control bias and risk perception, utilising a 
questionnaire approach and a subjects from a South African university i.e. 
individuals with a chronic Illusion of Control bias were more likely to have a lower 
perception of risk. Keh et al (2002), unlike the Simon et al (1999) study, revealed that 
small business owners do not believe that they can control market conditions, though 
they may believe they can influence future outcomes and take the necessary actions 
to hedge their risky positions. The study advised that engaging in counterfactual 
thinking, analysing the information available or asking for advice might avoid reliance 
on one’s instincts alone and thus reduce the illusion of control bias. 
 
2.8.6. Planning Fallacy 
 
The Planning Fallacy bias is exhibited where individuals overestimate the amount 
that they can accomplish given a fixed amount of time or resources. Baron (1998) 
states that entrepreneurs anchor their forecasts not on lessons from past similar 
experiences (see counterfactual thinking), but rather on a glowing image of the 
future, given that they have little relevant experience to draw upon. Kaish and Gilad 
(1991) note that smaller entrepreneurs need to use their own intuition to gauge the 
potential of the market or changes in the price of supplies given that they will not 
have economically sophisticated information gathering tools available to larger 
companies. It was found that the promise of financial incentive led to increased 
evidence of the Planning Fallacy bias (Buehler, Griffin and MacDonald; 1997). This 
finding suggests that applicants requesting a loan will exhibit the bias. Keh et al 
(2002) did not find support for the assertion that entrepreneurs who exhibit the bias 
will have a lower perception of risk. However, they attribute this to the possibility that 
the design of the methodology was overly vague. 
 
2.8.7. Biases in South African SMME entrepreneurs 
 
Several factors have been found to contribute to the emergence of cognitive biases 
and heuristics. Many of these factors are prevalent in the SMME environment, 













Inexperience has been shown to lead to Illusions of Control, Planning Fallacy and 
Lack of Counterfactual Thinking. Lack of education and financial illiteracy lead to 
Excessive Optimism and Overconfidence, while ambiguous or insufficient 
information lead to Excessive Optimism, Illusions of Control and Planning Fallacy. 




2.9. The impact of chronic cognitive bias traits on the creditworthiness 
decision 
 
It can reasonably be expected that the majority of entrepreneurs will exhibit elements 
of cognitive biases and heuristics in their decision making process. Based on the 
cited research, it is anticipated that many South African SMME entrepreneurs 
(particularly nascent entrepreneurs) will exhibit one or a combination of the 
Excessive Optimism, Escalation of Commitment, Lack of Counterfactual Thinking, 
Overconfidence, Illusion of Control or Planning Fallacy biases.  
 
Research into behavioural finance and the entrepreneur tells us that the very 
decision to become an entrepreneur is a risky one. Were nascent entrepreneurs to 
fully appreciate the risks involved (most new ventures fail (Ladzani and van Vuuren, 
2002)) and approach the decision rationally, they might not take the chance. Risk 
taking is a necessary ingredient for both successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs. 
Given this necessity, the search for an entrepreneur who exhibited no signs of 
irrational decision making would reveal good and bad prospects. Excessively 
irrational decision making may increase the chances of failing as an entrepreneur, 
just as complete aversion to risk taking would necessarily prevent an individual from 
becoming an entrepreneur. In a country with high unemployment rates, where many 
nascent entrepreneurs start businesses where few other opportunities are available, 
financial institutions need to screen for those individuals with reasonable 
predispositions to risk taking. There is also the possibility that risk averse individuals 












will apply for a loan. Screening for chronic cognitive biases can therefore never be 
the sole business lending technology. 
 
It should be noted that it is not the intention of this study to corroborate or prove prior 
relationships between entrepreneurs and the presence of specific cognitive biases. 
This research rather leverages off these findings. It is proposed that a combination of 
financial information, SBCS, prior historical exposure and insights into the 
entrepreneurial and management nature ought to be considered when making a 
lending decision involving an SMME business.  
 
It is the aim of this study to investigate whether the relationships that emerge during 
the application of a rational decision making screening methodology utilising insights, 
primarily from behavioural finance theory will add a dimension to the lending decision 
that may facilitate a more enlightened assessment. The study will examine each of 
the major lending technologies within this context. Relevant biases and heuristics 
within a sample of South African SMME owners will be compared to externally 
sourced creditworthiness information. Evidence as to the usefulness of Behavioural 
Finance insights within the creditworthiness assessment process will be derived. 


























Chapter 3 – Research methodology 
 
 
3.1  Chapter introduction 
 
The questionnaire based research methodology is introduced. The operalization of 
each of the Cognitive Biases and Heuristics is presented. Responses to the 
questionnaire are summarized and briefly presented as well as the limitations to the 
research methodology. The research variables and method of calculation are 
described. Finally, the research framework and the hypotheses are detailed.  
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION: CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND BANK LENDING 
TECHNOLOGIES
(The current mismatch, the bank technologies currently in use and their 
shortcomings, the potential for alternative screening technologies)
CHAPTER 2:
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE INSIGHTS IN THE CREDITWORTHINESS 
ASSESSMANT PROCESS
(Prior Behavioural Finance research within an SMME context, rational 




(Internet hosted questionnaire, measurement variables, hypotheses)
CHAPTER 4:
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence
 - Composite Score
CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS













3.2. Methodology introduction 
 
A mismatch between the demand and supply of SMME credit has been identified in 
the literature review. The difficulties that financial institutions face in identifying 
creditworthy candidates using the existing lending technologies was presented and 
the potential usefulness of alternative sources of creditworthiness information 
(primarily behavioural finance based) was proposed. The literature review and 
development of the hypothesis suggest that the manifestation of chronic cognitive 
biases and heuristics may provide pragmatically useful insights within the context of 
the creditworthiness assessment. The objective of this study is to gather and then 
empirically analyse behavioural based information from a sample of SMME 
entrepreneurs using vignettes within a questionnaires. 
 
Data was generated and analysed to investigate the viability of assessing non 
traditional sources of information as part of the creditworthiness decision. Nascent 
entrepreneurs who have recently (<1 year) started their businesses and have not yet 
generated a profit history were contrasted against more experienced entrepreneurs 
who have traded for over a year and generated a profit history. Existing 
creditworthiness information on more established entrepreneurs such as informative 
SBCS credit ratings are generally more readily available and accessible than 
information on nascent entrepreneurs. 
 
To achieve this aim, a questionnaire assessment was presented to fifty loan 
applicants on an internet platform. Several studies have based their conclusion on 
relatively small sample sizes e.g. De Maeseneire and Claeys’ (2011) study on SME 
finance constraints in SME’s Foreign Direct Investment projects (32 valid 
respondents), Hoelzl and Rustichini’s (2005) study on overconfidence (117 valid 
respondents), Sadler-Smith, Hampson, Chaston and Badger’s (2003) study on 
managerial behaviour and small business performance (156 valid responses) and 
Hmieleski and Ensley’s (2007) research on new venture performance (168 
managers’ responses from 66 firms),  A prior study by Keh, Foo and Lim (2002) 
encompassing decision making tasks used data from a  sample of 77 completed 












evidence in a statistically focused study, the data required for this research study 
was restricted and the sample size, while adequate, was limited. A minimum sample 
size of thirty is commonly accepted as approaching representation of the population 
in terms of the Central Limit Theorem. Nonparametric tests generally require no 
more than 15% additional subjects (Lehmann, 2006). The sample size of fifty used in 
this research undertaking is thus seen as acceptable. 
 
Consistent with past research on decision making processes and perceptions of risk 
(e.g. Simon et al, 1999; Zacharakis et al, 2001; Keh et al, 2002; le Roux et al, 2006), 
a case study approach is utilized to examine the respondent as a rational decision 
maker. A case study approach is also used to assess the respondent’s basic 
financial acumen. Hughes (1998) comments that the case study (vignette) is 
valuable as a research tool as theoretical explanations of risk behaviour develop and 
improve. Baron and Ward (2004) advocate the use of decision making or choice 
tasks as a vehicle for researching entrepreneurial reasoning. In a business 
evaluation context, case studies are useful in that they are able to frame the complex 
background required for the specific behaviour being examined. All respondents are 
exposed to the same information set. As advised by Keh et al (2002) case studies 
were kept short to avoid questionnaire fatigue and thus hurried, uniform answers. 
The background information to the vignette was generally no longer than a short 
paragraph. 
 
The questionnaire tested for evidence of the cognitive biases and the heuristics that 
were previously found to be linked to entrepreneurial predisposition to risk taking as 
discussed in section Chapter 2.8.  
 
3.2.1. Escalation of Commitment 
 
To capture evidence of the Escalation of Commitment bias, respondents were asked 
to evaluate a short vignette incorporating several relatively typical business decisions 
(Appendix A – Case Study 2). Each of the questions placed the respondent within 
circumstances where they were forced to either recommit to a prior decision despite 
feedback that suggested that the risk of a negative outcome was more likely than at 












utilized to determine the degree to which the respondent was influenced by the 
Escalation of Confidence bias. In certain questions where almost all of the 
respondents selected a similar course of action, the data was not used in the 
analysis on the basis that these questions were not effective in revealing evidence of 
a more or less than normal influence of the bias. Questions that elicited a more even 
spread of responses were used in the calculation of an Escalation of Commitment 
score as defined in 3.7. 
 
3.2.2. Lack of Counterfactual Thinking 
 
In capturing evidence of the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking bias, respondents were 
asked to evaluate a short vignette incorporating several relatively typical business 
decisions (Appendix A – Case Study 1). Each question elicited a response from the 
applicant based on their proclivity to recalling past events that lead to the current 
circumstances described in the vignette. The course of action selected by the 
respondents indicated the influence that counterfactual thinking exerted on their 
decision making processes. When analysing a particular question, those 
respondents who chose to dismiss information from past failures in similar 
circumstances as irrelevant typically exhibited Lack of Counterfactual Thinking. The 
results presented in 4.6 demonstrate that the vignette and questions were not 
successful in revealing the presence or absence of the Lack of Counterfactual 
Thinking bias. 
 
3.2.3. Illusions of Control 
 
To capture evidence of the Illusions of Control bias, respondents were asked to 
evaluate a short vignette incorporating several relatively typical business decisions 
(Appendix A – Case Study 4). Each of the questions placed the respondent within a 
situation where factors outside of their control were influencing their business 
operations. The respondent was then forced to commit to a course of action that 
would reveal the extent to which they felt they could influence or predict the ultimate 
manifestation of these external factors. Furthermore, a Likert scale was utilized to 
determine the degree to which the respondent was influenced by the Illusions of 












course of action, the question responses were not used in the analysis on the basis 
that these questions were not effective in revealing evidence of a more or less than 
normal influence of the bias. Questions that elicited a more even spread of 
responses were used in the calculation of an Illusions of Control score as defined in 
section 3.7. 
 
3.2.4. Planning Fallacy 
 
In capturing evidence of the Planning Fallacy bias, respondents were asked to 
evaluate a short vignette incorporating several relatively typical business decisions 
(Appendix A – Case Study 5). Loan applicants were asked to commit to a course of 
action given a set of circumstances that highlighted either limited availability of time 
or other resources. Respondents who made a decision where there was a strong 
likelihood that they would have insufficient resources or time to complete the task 
were judged to be more influenced by the Planning Fallacy bias. Furthermore, a 
Likert scale was utilized to determine the degree to which the respondent was 
influenced by the Planning Fallacy bias. Questions that were answered similarly by a 
vast majority of the respondents were disregarded in terms of further analysis. 
Questions that elicited a more even spread of responses were used in the 
calculation of a Planning Fallacy score as defined in 3.7. 
 
3.2.5. Excessive Optimism 
 
To capture evidence of the Excessive Optimism bias, respondents were asked to 
evaluate a short vignette incorporating several relatively typical business decisions 
(Appendix A – Case Study 3). Respondents answered a series of questions that 
included opportunities to further their business operations. The opportunities with 
higher payoffs had a greater chance of failure. Respondents were required to commit 
to a course of action that would prepare their operation for either the more optimistic 
but less likely opportunity or the more likely alternative. Respondents that 
consistently prepared for the more optimistic alternative were judged to be more 
influenced by the Excessive Optimism bias. Questions that were answered similarly 












Questions that elicited a more even spread of responses were used in the 




In order to capture evidence of the Overconfidence bias, respondents were required 
to answer a series of general knowledge questions. After each question, they were 
asked to rate their level of confidence on a scale from Zero to Five, that the answer 
that they gave was correct. Respondents that consistently assumed that their 
answers to the questions were correct despite them being false were judged to be 
labouring under the Overconfidence bias. The level of confidence attached to all 
questions that were answered incorrectly were summed and an Overconfidence 
score was calculated as defined in 3.7. 
 
In addition, the questionnaire tested for evidence of commercial numeracy skills, the 
extent of usage of financial information and the applicant’s willingness to offer 
collateral. The data was analysed against existing credit information available to the 
lending institution. Relationships between the various constructs were investigated 
and insights developed that might be useful to the lending institutions in reducing the 
uncertainty left unresolved by the existing lending technologies. In this manner, the 
incorporation of behavioural finance insights as a creditworthiness assessment tool 
was examined as a potentially useful instrument.  
 
 
3.3. Questionnaire Completion 
 
Several financial services companies specifically target the SMME credit market. 
Blue Financial Services, a company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
recently established a division to allocate loans to SMMEs. Blue’s large distribution 
network would facilitate the nationwide collection of responses thus reducing the 
possibility of a geographic bias. Their loan applicants therefore satisfied many of the 
requirements necessary for this research. The questionnaire was offered in English, 












excluded based on their language preference. The language selection would also 
assist in facilitating more accurate responses. 
 
Over the period February 2009 to October 2009, fifty loan applicants completed the 
questionnaire. An examination of the demographics of the loan applicants presented 
in Figure 3.1 revealed that 70% were male and 70% were over 30 years old. 50% of 
the businesses were start-ups. The industries that they were trading in were fairly 
diverse, with the largest proportion (42%) engaged in services. The applicants’ 
businesses were spread throughout South Africa (one applicant was based outside 
of South Africa’s borders) with most applicants located in the greater Johannesburg 
area. This is fairly representative of the South African economy. 
 
The size of the loan was recorded but not validated. This was treated as a neutral 
variable – of primary interest was only that the entrepreneur was seeking finance. 
Since the loan size was not key to the research undertaking and was unlikely to 
affect the findings, no further investigation into the size of the loan as a variable in 















Figure 3.1 Applicant demographic summary 
 
Each respondent’s identity was entered on the database of the Experian credit rating 
agency and a Delphi score requested. Experian, South Africa’s foremost consumer 
credit bureau, offers its subscribers a credit report and a Delphi credit score on all 
consumers who have purchased on credit in South Africa. The score is generated 
based on several factors including but not limited to whether an individual pays 
accounts on time and how much credit they have applied for in the past. While not 
shedding light on the current loan that the applicant is applying for, the Delphi credit 
score is expected to give an indication of likelihood of the entrepreneur defaulting on 
a future loan. Of the fifty completed questionnaires, Experian had calculated a Delphi 






















Less than 20 years old 1 2%
20 to 30 years old 14 28%
30 to 40 years old 17 34%




Western Cape 5 10%
Eastern Cape 5 10%
Kwazulu Natal 3 6%














score for 44 of the loan applicants. One of the remaining six applicants was a 
resident of Botswana with a Botswana identity number that was not recognised in the 
Experian database. The other five had an insufficient demographic or credit history 
for even a rudimentary score to be calculated. These applicants therefore yielded 
scores of zero (the most common scores are between 500 and 700). All of the 
questions in the questionnaire were completed by all respondents. The respondents 
were not able to submit the questionnaire without having completed it in full as the 




3.4. Limitations to the internet questionnaire and the vignette approach 
 
The questionnaire was delivered entirely on the internet. While greatly enhancing the 
research possibilities, there are certain pitfalls. In addition, given the internet based 
research methodology, respondents would need to have access to an online 
computer. This requirement would likely preclude the smallest most remote 
entrepreneurs from participating. Couper (2000) presents a host of benefits and 
drawbacks to the design of an internet administered questionnaire. Contrary to the 
traditional administered interview, no interviewer is available to explain unclear terms 
or to motivate respondents to complete the questions accurately. Compounding this,  
the manner of presentation of a question, including the choice of ‘radio buttons’ or 
other answer tools, the order of the pre-selected answers and the graphical 
presentation features, can have a profound effect on the eventual distribution of 
answers. In somewhat addressing the potential pitfalls, the fieldwork questionnaire 
was delivered using the ‘limesurvey.org’ survey platform to allow for standard, 
unsuggestive questionnaire templates. Limesurvey is used in many university 
research projects worldwide. The fact that respondents were completing the 
questionnaire as part of a loan application process lends a level of assurance that all 
questionnaires were attempted thoughtfully. 
 
Choi and Pak (2005) identified 48 types of biases that are found in questionnaires 
and categorised them into three sources: the question design, the questionnaire 












assembled with avoidance of these biases in mind (see Appendix B for a list). While 
the scope of the research project and the resources available precluded a rigorous 
analysis of whether all of these biases were avoided, cognisance was taken of the 
manner in which the questions were phrased, the presentation of the answer 
selection and the overall questionnaire delivery. The questionnaire was refined 
following an interview process with ten initial questionnaire respondents whose 
responses were not included in the data analysis. 
 
It was anticipated that certain questions would not sufficiently reveal evidence of 
cognitive biases and heuristics as was the case with Keh et al (2002). Six questions 
were posed for each bias under scrutiny to increase the probability of sufficiently 
revealing the required evidence. 
 
 
3.5. Limitations to the general methodology 
 
Limitations to the methodology are described in terms of the inherent difficulty in 
determining whether the applicant is an irrational decision maker as well as the level 
of financial management acumen that the applicant possesses. The limitations to the 
questionnaire tool are then presented. 
 
 
3.5.1 Assessing the applicants as a rational decision maker 
 
An effective methodology to assess the predisposition to rational decision making of 
an applicant for a loan and then to determine whether that information would be 
useful to the loan funder would be to assess the applicant before and during the 
duration of the loan repayment period and then to assess the payment history after 
the completion of the loan duration.  
 The assessment of the applicant’s tendency to rational decision making would 
be through a detailed evaluation via interview and business simulation 
examples and would form part of the official application process. The periodic 












business prior to and during the duration of the loan would serve to sharpen 
the initial assessment. 
 The ultimate assessment of creditworthiness would be an ex post facto 
analysis of the applicant’s payment history after the completion of the loan.  
 
No psychometric and lengthy behavioural analysis was conducted on the loan 
applicants during the application process nor was there screening of the applicant in 
the workplace as this would not have fit with an implicit goal of the study. 
Behavioural finance insights on loan applicants will be more useful to funders if they 
can be generated in a prompt and cost effective manner. If the insights can only be 
generated following a lengthy investigation, it is likely that they may not complement 
current commercial lending models that require timely decisions. For the purposes of 
the study, more would be learned by matching the data collection instrument with a 
technology more suitable for commercial deployment. 
 
In addition, the Blue Financial Services lending methodology did not cater for a more 
detailed psychometric or behavioural analysis of loan applicants. The lending 
environment is competitive and requires that the creditworthiness screening process 
be effective and efficient.  The management of the SMME lending division were 
inclined to limit the time required to complete the questionnaire to approximately 45 
minutes. 
 
Nevertheless, the research methodology was able to capture a loan applicant’s 
predisposition to rational decision making and likelihood of paying back a loan. It is 
important to note that the methodology preserved certain important variables 
necessary to forming a comprehensive understanding of the topic: 
 Assessments of the tendency to rational decision making were conducted on 
applicants for loans as opposed to students or other commonly used 
research subjects. 
 A questionnaire based vignette approach simulating common business 
transactions was utilised. This places the respondent’s frame of reference 
within a commercial setting and renders responses suitable to an evaluation 












particularly effective research tool if prepared carefully (Ellram, 1996). It is 
considerably more difficult to ascertain whether the respondent’s declared 
preferences in each of the questions would correspond with their revealed 
preference without periodic involvement with the entrepreneur during actual 
business transactions. This was not possible as none of the applicants were 
available for further research exercises. 
 
In determining the actual payment performance on the loan, since no ex post facto 
study was possible due to the extremely high rate of failed loan applications (see 
Chapter 3.5), an alternative understanding of the applicant’s payment history was 
sought. In addition, evidence of past loan repayments was revealed from the 
Experian credit bureau.  
 
3.5.2 Assessing the financial management competencies 
 
The financial literacy and utilisation of financial information by the respondents is 
also of interest in this study. To gain an accurate assessment of these financial 
aspects, one would both need to test the applicant’s abilities and ascertain which 
sources of information are used and to what degree. Ideally, one would monitor the 
management of the business and certain transactions over a period to gauge the 
business acumen through a series of reports and negotiations.  However, as stated, 
an implicit goal underpinning the research undertaking is to assess the loan 
applicants within the boundaries of a commercially plausible loan technology. 
Management at Blue Financial Services stressed the importance of containing the 
questionnaire completion time to 45 minutes. Longer screening processes result in 
delayed decision making and the possibility of frustrating potential borrowers – a 
significant drawback in an environment with seemingly limited viable funding 
prospects. A shorter evaluation was therefore required. 
 
Business acumen was evaluated through a practical short vignette that required the 
applicants to reveal their knowledge of basic financial concepts such as profits and 
product costing. Usage of financial information was assessed via a questionnaire 
approach which specifically questioned the sources of information utilised and the 












financial management tools and reports mentioned in past SMME research studies 
(Collis and Jarvis, 2002; Peel and Bridge, 1998; McMahon, 1998b). The 
questionnaire also assessed whether the applicants had collateral available and 
how willing they were to post collateral as security for a loan. 
 
Analyses were conducted for the overall sample of fifty entrepreneurs. In addition 
observations were explored based on the levels of entrepreneurial experience as a 
company owner. Entrepreneurs with less than one year’s experience who admitted 
to not having a profit history were classified as nascent. Those with over one year’s 
experience were classified as established. 
 
3.5.3 Limitations of the questionnaire evidence 
 
As no third party developed questionnaire is commercially available for the purposes 
of testing for all of the cognitive biases under investigation, one needed to be 
developed as part of the research undertaking. It must be highlighted that the 
purpose of the study is not to develop a psychometric instrument that has been 
statistically validated to accurately test for cognitive biases. The primary goal of this 
research undertaking is to investigate whether alternative forms of creditworthiness 
information have potential to contribute to the understanding and management of the 
SMME lending mismatch. Specifically, the findings are intended to suggest and then 
examine whether further investigation and development in alternative, commercially 
viable creditworthiness assessment technologies are warranted, not to rigorously 
identify the presence of specific cognitive biases within the area of South African 
entrepreneurial lending. The constraints were therefore such that the questionnaire 
had to be convenient, concise and user friendly such that no further resources were 
needed when gathering the loan applicant’s responses. The goals of the study and 
the data available required that the sample size be limited to fifty loan applicants. No 
meaningful factoral analysis of the questions within each of the constructs was 
possible given the small sample size, nor was a factoral analysis critical to the 
development of the findings. While several statistical tests were performed, the 














3.6. Ex post facto analysis 
 
General consensus suggests that there are several factors that prevent an optimally 
efficient flow of credit from suppliers to lenders. Lending institutions suggest that 
SMME owners lack financial and managerial skills and often present questionable 
business ideas. Affected SMME parties allege that credit is unfairly allocated, overly 
costly and practically unattainable. Evidence indicative of both stances was revealed 
in a brief ex post facto analysis of the outcome of each of the questionnaire 
respondent’s loan applications. Of applicants where a Delphi score was available, 
Table 3.1 reveals that 45% of the respondents never completed their loan 
applications, while 50% of the applications were rejected. None of the applicants 
successfully received a loan. 
 




Number 20 22 2 
Percentage 45% 50% 5% 
 
Incomplete applications 
Entrepreneurs may not have been able to complete their loan applications for 
several reasons: 
 A loan was received from another lending institution (however, it is more likely 
that these applicants would have formally withdrawn from the process than 
abandoned their incomplete applications). 
 Assuming they would be denied or asked for collateral they gave up midway. 
 The application process was too complex and demanding. 
 
Rejections 
The lending institution rejected half of the applications as they were not able to 
satisfy themselves that the entrepreneur would be able to repay the loan in line with 
the loan agreement. This may have been due to lack of certainty around the financial 













The credit mismatch was therefore evident in the sample forming part of this 
research undertaking. The importance in researching methodologies that reduce the 
prevailing credit constraints through reducing the uncertainties that affect current 
lending technologies became more evident. 
 
 
3.7. The measurement variables 
 
The three major factors identified as part of the current industry creditworthiness 
assessment are the SBCS (e.g. Experian), collateral to be posted and the financial 
information provided (business plans from nascent entrepreneurs and management 
accounts from existing businesses). The alternative variables being investigated are 
those of the entrepreneur’s propensity to make decisions that demonstrate evidence 
of the specific cognitive biases that are being investigated. In order to test the 
hypotheses detailed below, a numerical value is derived for each of these factors: 
Small Business Credit Scoring (SBCS): The Experian Delphi score is utilised. The 
higher the score, the more creditworthy the applicant is deemed to be. 
Scores will generally range between 500 and 700 though lower and 
higher scores are possible. 
Collateral: The applicant’s willingness to post collateral as security is derived 
utilising a five-point Likert scale. A higher score indicates more 
willingness to post collateral. 
Financial information: A financial sophistication measurement is derived comprising 
two elements. The frequency with which applicants utilise financial 
information is determined by having the applicants indicate on a five-
point Likert scale the extent to which they utilize each of twenty tools 
and reports identified in past SMME financial management research 
studies (Collis and Jarvis, 2002; Peel and Bridge, 1998; McMahon, 
1998b). The formula presented below accumulates the applicant’s 
answers to the twenty questions giving a maximum score of 100. An 
equation then converts the score to between an integer between -1 and 
1. 
 
















The second element tests the applicant’s commercial acumen. Insight 
into commercial numeracy skills is measured by a simple vignette 
included in the questionnaire which requires the respondent to 
determine the selling price of a product based on the information 
provided. Five questions were presented and the number of correct 
responses were accumulated to derive a score of between one and 
five. Concerning both derived factors, a higher score indicates greater 
financial ability. 
 
Propensity to rational decision making: 
Two measures are derived that give an indication as to the presence of cognitive 
biases i.e. the Cognitive Risk Propensity (CRP) and the Overconfidence factor. 
 
CRP: Four cognitive biases (Illusions of Control, Planning Fallacy, Excessive 
Optimism and Escalation of Commitment) and one decision heuristic 
(Lack of Counterfactual Thinking) are measured through the applicant’s 
responses to separate case studies. Each case study comprises six 
questions testing for evidence of the individual cognitive bias or 
heuristic via a five-point Likert scale. Responses to each question were 
plotted on a histogram and the questions that elicited the most even 
distribution of answers within each cognitive bias construct were 
analysed further. A mathematically derived score between –1 and 1 
was then determined for each bias and heuristic utilising the formula 
listed below. The number of questions utilized in each of the cognitive 
biases is represented as n in the equation. 
  
{[((((CognitiveBias1 + CognitiveBias2 + ... + CognitiveBiasn)-n)*2) / 5n-5) – 1] x -1}.  
 
An overall CRP score comprising responses to the questions with the 












mathematical equation. The higher the score, the more inclined to 
rational decision making the applicant was found to be. 
Overconfidence: Since overconfidence does not on its own indicate the 
predisposition to risk taking (Simon et al, 1999; Keh et al, 2002) but 
can exacerbate the manifestation of other biases, a measure is 
determined. The respondent is asked a series of six general knowledge 
questions as well as the level of their confidence (six-point Likert scale 
including a zero if the applicant has no confidence in the answer at all) 
that the answers were correct. A mathematically derived score is 
determined by adding the confidence levels of incorrectly answered 
questions (represented as n) utilizing the following formula: 
  
{[((((IncorrectOCquestion1 + IncorrectOCquestion 2 + ... + IncorrectOCquestion n)-n)*2) / 5n-n) – 
1] x -1} 
 
The score is then computed to between –1 and 1. A higher answer 
indicates the presence of overconfidence. 
 
 
3.8. The research framework and the hypotheses 
 
The assessment of an entrepreneur’s cognitive risk propensity and level of financial 
sophistication will be tested within the predefined research framework. Existing 
lending technologies will be contrasted with the new evidence and areas identified 
where it is felt that supplementary information seems to benefit the creditworthiness 
assessment process. Hypotheses are then formulated. 
 
3.8.1 Small Business Credit Scoring 
 
The widespread and successful usage of SBCS (an analysis of the applicant’s credit 
history incorporating past credit decisions) is evidence that a departure from the 
lending methodologies grounded in Modern Financial Theory is beneficial. In cases 
where an applicant has a rich credit history as a consequence of many credit 












credit decisions made. Where there is little credit history, the score, if one can be 
produced, will be based on demographic information only, as little can be said about 
past decisions. This is likely to be a common feature at a nascent entrepreneurial 
level where younger, newer entrants to the credit market are attempting to start their 
business careers. An alternative insight into the levels of rational (not chronically 
risky) decision making tendencies would enable the loan officer to modify the SBCS 
to include this missing element, particularly at this nascent entrepreneurial level. In 
addition, it is expected that the CRP score should to some extent mirror the SBCS in 
cases where a rich credit history is a substantial element of that score. With more 
established entrepreneurs, this correlation should be more evident. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is thus stated as follows: 
 
H1: The cognitive risk propensity (CRP score) will be positively correlated with the 
credit agency (Delphi score) rating (H1). 
 
Small Business Credit Scoring may give an indication as to the applicant’s 
predisposition to risk taking, though no specific association has been directly 
demonstrated before. A correlation between the applicant’s Delphi credit score (a 
key variable behind a Small Business Credit Score), and cognitive risk propensity 
(CRP score) may indicate that the applicant’s personal credit history gives an 
indication of their business decision making prejudices and vice versa. Should this 
correlation be noteworthy, the finding may give rise to a useful lending tool for 
verification of the decision making tendencies of established entrepreneurs and 
previously unavailable insights into the nascent entrepreneur’s risk propensity. 
 
3.8.2 Financial Statement lending 
 
Those who use and can present financial information assist the loan officer in 
framing the decision within the principles of Modern Finance Theory. The bank is 
able to demand and scrutinize the ratios and the borrower understands the ratios. All 
of the relevant information is available and reliable – thus fully informed and rational 
decisions can be made. Where the SMME borrower is not able to present the figures 












prospects within this sector are to be catered for. Alternatively, failure to comply with 
the bank’s demands may indicate that those borrowers are not desirable prospects. 
Certain applicants may genuinely intend to provide all of the prescribed information 
though they are simply not capable. They wish for the bank to be fully informed and 
may even value the loan officer’s insights and questions. As their firms grow, they 
may prioritise the acquisition of financial resources so that the required information is 
more readily available. Rather than reject all applicants who cannot provide the 
required financial information within the allowed time constraints, banks might 
reassess those entrepreneurs who value financial information and would provide the 
required information if it were available. 
 
Overconfidence is the failure to know the limits of one’s knowledge or ability resulting 
in the overestimation of one’s certainty regarding facts or outcomes. The 
overconfident individual may be less inclined to search for information (Zacharakis 
and Shepherd, 2001) and may not value the insights of others. It is suggested that 
applicants demonstrating overconfidence will therefore be less inclined to utilise and 
rely on financial information as an integral aspect of the management function. This 
will be examined through the dual aspect of commercial numeracy (do low scorers 
on the commercial numeracy case study exhibit overconfidence) and financial 
information usage (do overconfident individuals make little usage and place little 
value on the various financial reports). Hypothesis 2 is thus stated as follows: 
 
H2: Overconfidence will be negatively correlated with financial sophistication (H2). 
 
A further question on bank loan officer’s reluctance to lend to applicants who cannot 
meet the financial information demands must be posed: Is it misdirected? Can one 
conclusively assume that those less financially sophisticated entrepreneurs are more 
inclined to fail? Given that one’s predisposition to taking risky decisions is an 
indicator of whether they are desirable candidates for a loan (Buttner and Rosen, 
1988), establishing a correlation between financial sophistication and CRP may 
reveal whether the bank’s reluctance to deal with this market is misplaced. 













H3: Financial sophistication will be positively correlated with cognitive risk 
propensity (more irrational decision making) (H3). 
 
Financial sophistication will be analysed on the two levels stated previously i.e. 
commercial numeracy and extent of usage of financial information. 
 
3.8.3 Relationship lending 
 
In instances where the lending institution has an established relationship with the 
loan applicant, the loan officer may have more certainty regarding the risk of loss 
attached to lending. In these circumstances, one might perceive there to be less 
incentive to demand collateral though previous research has found there to be 
conflicting evidence in this regard (Sharpe, 1990; Berger and Udell, 1995; Degryse 
and Van Cayseele, 2000). The lending institutions will generally demand collateral 
regardless of the length of the relationship, particularly in a sector where losses are 
more likely to occur. This situation will be exacerbated where many applicants do not 
have established relationships with the lending institutions. Rather than commit 
costly resources to a thorough investigation of the entrepreneur’s prospects, the 
bank can reduce the risk of suffering a loss through collateral.  
 
It is often argued that many entrepreneurs are precluded from accessing credit as 
they cannot afford the collateral. Alternatively, discouraged borrowers do not apply 
for loans as they expect that collateral will be demanded or they are unwilling to risk 
collateral. It is possible that rational entrepreneurs with sound business models do 
not apply for needed borrowings given their aversion to the risk of losing their 
collateral. Equally possible is the propensity of irrational entrepreneurs to post 
collateral given their chronic willingness to enter into highly risky transactions. 
Recent research in Japan has found that riskier borrowers are more willing to post 
collateral (Ono and Uesugi; 2009). Alternatively, high propensity to risk taking may 
be associated with a reluctance to post collateral as entrepreneurs sense the greater 
possibility of failure associated with the venture. This may depend on whether the 
applicants have collateral or not. Lending institutions have not concerned themselves 
with the motives behind the posting of collateral. The rationale has been less 












intentions might afford the bank the ability to lessen the collateral demands while not 
significantly increasing the risk of loss. Hypothesis 4 is thus stated as follows: 
 
H4: Collateral dread will be positively correlated with cognitive risk propensity 
(more rational decision making) (H4). 
 
An understanding of the loan applicant’s predisposition to risk taking through the 
applicant’s cognitive biases and willingness to post collateral provides a limited 
though useful alternative to the insights a bank officer would gain through a lengthy 
relationship with the entrepreneur. An additional insight of significant interest to the 
loan officer is the financial sophistication exhibited by the applicant. The loan officer 
may assume that the applicant’s predisposition to posting collateral, coupled with the 
opacity of the information provided, carries with it an element of moral hazard. The 
applicant is aware of the true risks inherent in the project to be financed and the 
decision to post collateral is based on this knowledge. The loan officer is not privy to 
this information and must therefore demand collateral regardless of the true financial 
possibilities inherent in the project. Whether the level of financial sophistication 
influences the willingness of the applicant to post collateral is therefore of great 
interest to the lending officer. This collateral dread may be associated with a low 
level of financial management sophistication leading to a heightened uncertainty as 
to the chances of success. This heightened uncertainty may result from lack of 
information (the applicant does not make use of financial reports) or lack of 
commercial numeracy (the applicant does not understand basic financial concepts 
sufficiently). The collateral dread phenomenon will be analysed against both of these 
components. Hypothesis 5 is thus stated as follows: 
 
H5: Collateral dread will be negatively correlated with financial sophistication (H5). 
 
 
3.9. Statistical analysis methodology 
 
The distribution of many of the data sample fields was not normal and the sample 
sizes were relatively small.  The nonparametric Spearman’s correlation analysis was 












well as the overall CRP score, Overconfidence score, Experian Delphi Credit Score, 
level of usage of financial, commercial numeracy and willingness to offer collateral. 
Evidence of correlations between the variables that were greater than 0.15, 
indicating a minor relationship, were analysed further and described. A Chi-Square 
test was conducted between each of the constructs within the CRP score and the 
Delphi Credit Score as further descriptive evidence. The correlations that emerged 
and the descriptions thereof were used as evidence in determining whether the 





































Chapter 4 – Analysis of the Results 
 
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
A brief description of the questionnaire responses and sample stratification is 
outlined. Results and analyses are then presented by Cognitive Bias and Heuristic. 
Findings are then summarized and their implications in support of each of the 
hypotheses are discussed. 
 
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION: CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND BANK LENDING 
TECHNOLOGIES
(The current mismatch, the bank technologies currently in use and their 
shortcomings, the potential for alternative screening technologies)
CHAPTER 2:
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE INSIGHTS IN THE CREDITWORTHINESS 
ASSESSMANT PROCESS
(Prior Behavioural Finance research within an SMME context, rational 




(Internet hosted questionnaire, measurement variables, hypotheses)
CHAPTER 4:
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence
 - Composite Score
CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS













4.2. Introduction to results analysis 
 
Each of the fifty respondents completed the online questionnaire (presented in print 
in Appendix A) in full. All of the responses were gathered and the variables detailed 
in Section 3.6 were calculated for each applicant. In order for the individual Cognitive 
Biases and overall CRP score to be calculated, responses were analysed and the 
most informative questions identified. Thereafter, the correlation analyses were 
performed and relationships analysed and described. Support for the various 
hypotheses were identified and then summarised. 
 
 
4.3. Questionnaire responses 
 
Each vignette contained six questions to which fifty respondents chose on a 5-point 
Likert scale to what extent they agreed or disagreed with a stated course of action. 
Answers of 4 or 5 indicate the more risky courses of action, and answers of 1 or 2, 
less risky approaches. See Appendix A for the questionnaire. Table 4.1 lists the 



























Table 4.1 Mean, Mode and Median for case study questions 
Question Name Mean Mode Median 
LC1_software 1.94 2 2 
LC2_strike 3.56 4 4 
LC3_infoerror 4.56 5 5 
LC4_reprimand 1.94 1 2 
LC5_journal 1.36 1 1 
LC6_priceerror 4.02 4 4 
EC1_containers 2.72 2 2 
EC2_roaster 3.08 4 4 
EC3_shares 3.04 4 3.5 
EC4_deposit 3.56 4 4 
EC5_newtea 2.94 2 2 
EC6_website 3.78 4 4 
EO1_tender 2.28 2 2 
EO2_technology 3.84 4 4 
EO3_radios 2.94 4 3 
EO4_sellshares 3.30 4 4 
EO5_listing 3.70 4 4 
EO6_insurance 1.98 1 2 
IC1_auctions 3.62 4 4 
IC2_cover 2.14 2 2 
IC3_predict 2.56 2 2 
IC4_rain 3.26 4 4 
IC5_tender 2.86 2 2 
IC6_import 2.30 2 2 
PF1_lessloan 3.00 4 3.5 
PF2_retrench 3.36 4 4 
PF3_visit 2.52 2 2 
PF4_marketing 2.40 2 2 
PF5_launchttel 2.28 2 2 
PF6_launchKyl 2.26 2 2 
 
Key to Table 4.1 
LC Lack of Counterfactual Thinking 
EO Excessive Optimism 
EC Escalation of Commitment 
IC Illusion of Control 
PF Planning Fallacy 
 
Nine of the fifty respondents answered the questions in Afrikaans and 41 in English. 
No applicants chose to answer the questionnaire in Zulu or Sotho. This choice was 
interesting – at least twenty (40%) of the applicants who completed the questionnaire 
were black entrepreneurs. Reasons for their language preference are beyond the 
scope of this study though the understanding of black entrepreneur’s language 
preferences may yield valuable insights into the training and development of this 












of the effects of language policy in South Africa on business efficiency and 
workplace productivity (Alexander, 1997; Webb, 2002). 
 
In many instances, respondents overwhelmingly chose a similar course of action for 
a specific vignette question. Those questions did not adequately test for the loan 
applicant’s propensity to irrational decision making relative to the remaining 
population of entrepreneurs applying for a similar loan and were therefore 
discounted. The responses that most informatively reveal evidence of cognitive 
biases will be those related to questions that yielded the most normal distributions of 
high and low risk responses. The mean should approximate three and the histogram 
should display an approximately equal stacking of responses around the centre 
(histograms for all questions are included in Appendix C). These risk propensity 
revealing questions were drawn from each of the cognitive biases tested barring the 
Lack of Counterfactual Thinking bias (as will be explained in section 4.6). They were 
then included in a calculation of the individual bias score and the overall (revised) 
Cognitive Risk Propensity (CRP) of each respondent and manipulated into a score of 
between –1 and 1. A low score indicates chronic evidence of the cognitive bias or 
heuristic. 
 
The two most revealing questions from each cognitive bias were incorporated into 
both the assessment of each cognitive bias and the CRP score. All of the questions 
in the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking vignette failed to elicit sufficient evidence of 
an individual chronic lack or excess of the bias when compared to the population. 
This is evident from the widely varying mean (Table 4.1) and abnormal histogram 
spread (Figure 4.2) found in each of the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking questions. 
No questions were included in the calculation of the CRP scores for the applicants. 



















Table 4.2 Most informative Cognitive Bias questions 
Question Name Mean Mode Median 
EC3_shares 3.04 4 3.5 
EC5_newtea 2.94 2 2 
EO3_radios 2.94 4 3 
EO4_sellshares 3.30 4 4 
IC4_rain 3.26 4 4 
IC5_tender 2.86 2 2 
PF1_lessloan 3.00 4 3.5 
PF2_retrench 3.36 4 4 
 
 
Histograms for each question reveal an even distribution of responses around the 
centre. A response of 1 or 2 indicates disagreement with a stated action while a 
response of 4 or 5 indicates agreement. These are presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
The histograms reveal that applicants were sufficiently divided on the choice of a risk 
averse or risk taking approach to the business issue presented. From these 
questions, an indication of the loan applicant as a rational or irrational decision 
maker was developed within each of the cognitive bias constructs and a combination 




























Figure 4.1. Histogram of assessed questions 
 
Key to Figure 4.1 
EC Escalation of Commitment 
EO Excessive Optimism 
IC Illusion of Control 
PF Planning Fallacy 
 
 
4.4. Analysis and stratification of the questionnaire data 
 
The relatively small sample size made it difficult to conclude as to the normality of 
the sample responses. For this reason, a nonparametric statistical analysis of the 
data was conducted and these finding were included in the correlation tables 













Spearman’s nonparametric correlation table (Table 4.3) presents the relationships 
that emerged between each of the questions, cognitive biases and the other 
measurement variables at the overall sample level: 
 




The sample population is further stratified by more established 2(more than one 
year’s experience and a profit history) entrepreneurs in Table 4.4 and nascent (less 









                                                 





























Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .200 -.102 -.017 .070 -.054 .269 .189 .075 -.207
Sig. (2-tailed) . .192 .510 .911 .650 .726 .077 .219 .631 .178
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
Correlation Coefficient .200 1.000 -.042 .110 .240 .060 .479** .576** .691** .531**
Sig. (2-tailed) .192 . .772 .447 .093 .678 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation Coefficient -.102 -.042 1.000 .025 .226 .151 -.259 .175 -.029 .000
Sig. (2-tailed) .510 .772 . .865 .115 .295 .069 .223 .842 .998
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation Coefficient -.017 .110 .025 1.000 .064 .256 .052 -.149 .267 .056
Sig. (2-tailed) .911 .447 .865 . .659 .072 .721 .303 .061 .699
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation Coefficient .070 .240 .226 .064 1.000 .423** .074 .072 .184 .144
Sig. (2-tailed) .650 .093 .115 .659 . .002 .611 .619 .201 .317
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation Coefficient -.054 .060 .151 .256 .423** 1.000 .150 -.049 .049 -.022
Sig. (2-tailed) .726 .678 .295 .072 .002 . .300 .735 .734 .878
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation Coefficient .269 .479** -.259 .052 .074 .150 1.000 .036 .122 -.077
Sig. (2-tailed) .077 .000 .069 .721 .611 .300 . .803 .399 .593
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation Coefficient .189 .576** .175 -.149 .072 -.049 .036 1.000 .157 .122
Sig. (2-tailed) .219 .000 .223 .303 .619 .735 .803 . .275 .398
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation Coefficient .075 .691** -.029 .267 .184 .049 .122 .157 1.000 .303*
Sig. (2-tailed) .631 .000 .842 .061 .201 .734 .399 .275 . .033
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Correlation Coefficient -.207 .531** .000 .056 .144 -.022 -.077 .122 .303* 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .178 .000 .998 .699 .317 .878 .593 .398 .033 .
N 44 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
 
Spearman's rho Experian Delphi Score
Cognitive Risk 
Propensity Score
Willingness to post 
collateral
Questions answ ered 
correctly
Overconfidence Score
































































Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .340 .120 -.028 .578** .230 .469* .102 .255 -.281
Sig. (2-tailed) . .121 .595 .903 .005 .303 .028 .652 .251 .205
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Correlation Coefficient .340 1.000 .104 -.059 .214 .009 .402* .691** .736** .579**
Sig. (2-tailed) .121 . .622 .779 .304 .968 .046 .000 .000 .002
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient .120 .104 1.000 .160 -.098 -.083 -.165 .265 .092 .010
Sig. (2-tailed) .595 .622 . .446 .642 .693 .430 .201 .661 .963
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient -.028 -.059 .160 1.000 .105 .222 -.056 -.185 .054 .005
Sig. (2-tailed) .903 .779 .446 . .618 .286 .789 .375 .797 .981
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient .578** .214 -.098 .105 1.000 .418* .440* .129 .128 -.257
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .304 .642 .618 . .037 .028 .539 .542 .216
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient .230 .009 -.083 .222 .418* 1.000 .243 .118 .017 -.347
Sig. (2-tailed) .303 .968 .693 .286 .037 . .242 .574 .936 .089
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient .469* .402* -.165 -.056 .440* .243 1.000 .123 -.060 -.053
Sig. (2-tailed) .028 .046 .430 .789 .028 .242 . .557 .776 .800
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient .102 .691** .265 -.185 .129 .118 .123 1.000 .381 .270
Sig. (2-tailed) .652 .000 .201 .375 .539 .574 .557 . .061 .192
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient .255 .736** .092 .054 .128 .017 -.060 .381 1.000 .325
Sig. (2-tailed) .251 .000 .661 .797 .542 .936 .776 .061 . .113
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient -.281 .579** .010 .005 -.257 -.347 -.053 .270 .325 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .205 .002 .963 .981 .216 .089 .800 .192 .113 .
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Planning Fallacy Score
**. Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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4.5. Introduction to findings presentation 
 
The aim of this research is to determine whether alternative lending technologies 
centred on the entrepreneur’s propensity to rational decision making can support 
traditional lending technologies. Findings of the statistical analyses are presented 
accordingly. Initially, Individual cognitive biases are analysed and explained 
independently of each other. Based on the relationships that emerge, the 
implications for existing lending technologies are discussed. Established and 
nascent entrepreneurs will be contrasted to highlight the potential impact of 
behavioural finance insights within more stratified entrepreneurial classes. 
Correlations of less than 0.15 are considered inconclusive and will not be discussed. 





























Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .015 -.313 -.046 -.313 -.258 .020 .174 -.119 -.118
Sig. (2-tailed) . .948 .156 .838 .156 .246 .931 .440 .597 .602
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Correlation Coefficient .015 1.000 -.193 .367 .244 .130 .602** .361 .643** .505*
Sig. (2-tailed) .948 . .356 .071 .239 .535 .001 .076 .001 .010
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient -.313 -.193 1.000 -.095 .502* .368 -.283 .101 -.149 -.053
Sig. (2-tailed) .156 .356 . .651 .011 .070 .170 .632 .477 .801
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient -.046 .367 -.095 1.000 .057 .316 .189 -.126 .530** .118
Sig. (2-tailed) .838 .071 .651 . .787 .124 .364 .548 .006 .575
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient -.313 .244 .502* .057 1.000 .355 -.116 .051 .236 .411*
Sig. (2-tailed) .156 .239 .011 .787 . .081 .580 .810 .255 .041
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient -.258 .130 .368 .316 .355 1.000 .170 -.145 .144 .178
Sig. (2-tailed) .246 .535 .070 .124 .081 . .416 .489 .493 .394
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient .020 .602** -.283 .189 -.116 .170 1.000 -.056 .308 -.054
Sig. (2-tailed) .931 .001 .170 .364 .580 .416 . .789 .134 .796
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient .174 .361 .101 -.126 .051 -.145 -.056 1.000 -.157 -.030
Sig. (2-tailed) .440 .076 .632 .548 .810 .489 .789 . .455 .887
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient -.119 .643** -.149 .530** .236 .144 .308 -.157 1.000 .321
Sig. (2-tailed) .597 .001 .477 .006 .255 .493 .134 .455 . .118
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Correlation Coefficient -.118 .505* -.053 .118 .411* .178 -.054 -.030 .321 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .602 .010 .801 .575 .041 .394 .796 .887 .118 .
N 22 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Planning Fallacy Score
**. Correlation is signif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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4.6. Escalation of Commitment 
 
Table 4.6 indicates that at an overall sample population level, no strong correlations 
emerged between the Escalation of Commitment bias and any of the other 
constructs under investigation, though some minor and moderate correlations 
warrant further discussion. These will be analysed within the context of each of the 
existing lending technologies. 
 
4.6.1. Correlation insights 
 






Financial Statement lending Relationship 
lending 
 Delphi Commercial 
Numeracy 
Usage of Financial 
information 
Overconfidence Willingness to post 
collateral 
Overall Sample 0.269  0.052  0.150  0.074  0.259  
Established 
entrepreneurs 
0.469  -0.056  0.243  0.440  0.165  
Nascent 
Entrepreneurs 
0.020  0.189  0.170  -0.116  0.283  
 
CHAPTER 4:
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence













4.6.2. Escalation of Commitment and Small Business Credit Scoring 
 
The Delphi score is comprised of both demographic information (such as age and 
gender) and past performance on loans and other forms of credit. The distribution of 
the Delphi scores was not normal for the sample nor for both the nascent and 
established entrepreneurial sub-sets. Scores were tightly distributed within a 
particularly narrow range that gave little indication of creditworthiness. This suggests 
that minimal credit history was available to generate a truly reflective credit score for 
many of the loan applicants in both entrepreneurial classes. Nevertheless, a 
moderate relationship seemed to exist when comparing evidence of the Escalation of 
Commitment bias at the established level (0.469) while no apparent relationship 
existed at the nascent entrepreneurs (0.020), suggesting that the established 
entrepreneurial scores may have been influenced to a greater degree by non 
demographic information. The correlation at the established entrepreneurial level 
was significant at the 0.05 level. Since evidence of the Escalation of Commitment 
bias within the decision making process seems to also indicate poor credit decisions, 
the relationship at the established level may be pragmatically useful. 
 
A Chi-Square test was performed to test for independence of the two constructs. 
While one cannot conclude as to significant relationships due to the small sample 
size, the table of findings is included (Table 4.7). The test reaffirms that 



























The correlation found between the Escalation of Commitment bias and the Delphi 
score (0.469) implies that established entrepreneurs influenced by the Escalation of 
Commitment bias are more likely to possess a poor credit history. These 
entrepreneurs are likely to commit themselves to an unaffordable loan despite 
feedback indicating that the project returns will not be sufficient to service the debt.  
 
Both the Escalation of Commitment score and the Delphi score are intended to 
quantify the level of risk inherent in the loan applicant. A strong correlation between 
the two, particularly at the established entrepreneurial level, would indicate a useful 
creditworthiness tool. In the instance that an inconclusive Delphi score was 
generated for a particular loan applicant with little or no credit history, an informative 
Escalation of Commitment score might provide the necessary information as to the 
applicant’s ability to repay the loan. 
 
1 -.2 and less 2 -.2 - .2 3 .2 and more
Count 6 4 3 13
Expected Count 4.4 3.9 4.7 13.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
46.2% 30.8% 23.1% 100.0%
% within EC_SELECT_CAT 
EC SELECT CAT
35.3% 26.7% 16.7% 26.0%
Count 7 9 9 25
Expected Count 8.5 7.5 9.0 25.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
28.0% 36.0% 36.0% 100.0%
% within EC_SELECT_CAT 
EC SELECT CAT
41.2% 60.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Count 4 2 6 12
Expected Count 4.1 3.6 4.3 12.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 100.0%
% within EC_SELECT_CAT 
EC SELECT CAT
23.5% 13.3% 33.3% 24.0%
Count 17 15 18 50
Expected Count 17.0 15.0 18.0 50.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
34.0% 30.0% 36.0% 100.0%
% within EC_SELECT_CAT 
EC SELECT CAT
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 3.101a 4 .541
Likelihood Ratio 3.198 4 .525
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.413 1 .235
N of Valid Cases 50
Crosstab
 Escalation of Commitment CAT
Total
experiancat Experian cat 1 584 and less
2 585 - 590
3 591 and higher
Total
Chi-Square Tests












4.6.3. Escalation of Commitment and Financial Statement lending 
 
It may be assumed that loan applicants that present financial information to the 
lending institution are able to interpret that information. Frequently, at the SMME 
level, it emerges that the applicant is not able to interpret and discuss that 
information adequately (Fisher, 2009). It then becomes more difficult to rely upon this 
information as part of the decision making process since any technical questions that 
emerge cannot be adequately answered. 
 
At the established level, minor to moderate correlations emerged between the 
Escalation of Commitment bias and both the regularity with which the entrepreneurs 
utilize financial information (0.243) and their levels of overconfidence (0.440). The 
correlation with overconfidence was significant at the 0.05 level. These relationships 
were less evident at the nascent entrepreneurial level. 
 
In addition, a relationship emerged between commercial numeracy and level of 
usage of financial information at the overall sample level (0.256) and when stratified 
by entrepreneurial groups (0.222 for established entrepreneurs; 0.316 for nascent 
entrepreneurs). This relationship suggests that more commercially literate 
entrepreneurs make greater usage of financial reports given their understanding of 
the information contained therein. 
 
4.6.3.1. Financial information usage 
 
Nascent entrepreneurs are said to be lacking in financial management skills 
(Schoombee, 2004; GEM, 2003). Few micro enterprises keep or comply with 
financial record keeping requirements. It was therefore expected that a minor 
relationship (0.170) would emerge at a nascent level when analysing usage of 
financial information, since previous research findings indicated that many nascent 
entrepreneurs (rational or otherwise) made little usage of financial information 
(Finscope, 2006). Marginally more revealing is the correlation at the established 
entrepreneurial level (0.243). Established entrepreneurs who are more inclined to re-
commit to a previous course of action even when faced with negative feedback are 













Two scenarios are suggested in analysing the direction of causation: 
 
The presence of the Escalation of Commitment bias causes the entrepreneur to use 
financial information less 
 
Biased entrepreneurs may look to avoid disproving their questionable decisions with 
numbers that contradict their mind-set. Less biased entrepreneurs make more 
regular use of financial information, however many SMME business owners 
(knowingly or otherwise) manipulate their company results to create an illusory 
image of financial health for presentation to lenders (von Blottnitz, 2009). Where the 
information is manipulated and unreliable, one might have expected those 
entrepreneurs more influenced by the Escalation of Commitment bias to regularly 
use the financial information. No evidence was found to support this. Rather, those 
entrepreneurs more influenced by the Escalation of Commitment bias, making less 
regular usage of financial information might be those inclined to manipulate their 
figures. 
 
The difficulty in assessing which of the loan applicants has presented a true picture 
of past and future trading and which hasn’t is a catalyst for the widespread practice 
of requesting collateral. Prior knowledge of the applicant’s predisposition to the 
Escalation of Commitment bias may shed some light on the validity of both the 
financial information that has been presented and the owner’s interpretation of those 
results. 
 
Usage of financial information results in less escalation of commitment 
 
In this scenario, the financial information that is available is habitually checked and 
results in the entrepreneur relying on the information without being influenced by the 
Escalation of Commitment bias. Research indicating that SMME financial information 
is often manipulated, makes this scenario unlikely. It is more likely that questionable 
financial information intensifies the need for alternative methods to reduce the 













Prior knowledge of the applicant’s predisposition to the Escalation of Commitment 
bias may shed further evidence on whether the financial information has been 
(knowingly or unknowingly) manipulated or misinterpreted. This may enable the loan 
officer to adjust the level to which reliance is placed on financial information 




A moderate correlation was found with regards to established entrepreneurs (0.440), 
which was significant at the 0.05 level. An inconclusive correlation was found 
amongst nascent entrepreneurs (-0.116) though the direction differed. While at an 
established entrepreneurial level, loan applicants that are not influenced by the 
Escalation of Commitment bias are likely to exhibit overconfidence, at the nascent 
level, the relationship was not found. These more experienced entrepreneurs will be 
more considerate of the negative feedback that they receive and more confident of 
the correctness of their ultimate decisions. They will be more willing to reverse their 
decisions, but less mindful of third party advice as to whether the revised decision is 
correct. However, regarding nascent entrepreneurs, negative feedback is considered 
less frequently (the nascent candidates had a lower average Escalation of 
Commitment score than the established entrepreneurs) though this trend gives little 
insight into their tendencies towards overconfidence. 
 
Within the Escalation of Commitment construct, higher overconfidence is generally 
associated with lower levels of risk taking. This conflicts with the normative view from 
the perspective of the lending institution. Where overconfidence manifests in the 
entrepreneur’s reluctance to take advice from the loan officer, the venture is currently 
regarded as more risky. While one cannot assume the opposite to be true 
(particularly at the nascent entrepreneurial level), the finding suggests that rational 
decision makers may be more confident in their own abilities and less confident of 
others. The established entrepreneurs’ reluctance to include loan officers in business 
decision making processes should be further understood in the light of the project 













The distinct divergence in results between the established and nascent 
entrepreneurial classes may also be of use to the lending institution. This difference 
was also evident in the Planning Fallacy correlation results albeit with an opposite 
effect. It is perhaps indicative of the heightened need for segregated data pools and 
distinct assessment methodologies when screening the financial information and 
behavioural characteristics of the two entrepreneurial classes. 
 
4.6.4. Escalation of Commitment and Relationship Lending 
 
A minor correlation emerged between the Escalation of Commitment bias and the 
willingness with which the entrepreneur was prepared to post collateral (0.259). This 
relationship was marginally more evident at the nascent entrepreneurial level 
(0.283).  
 
4.6.4.1. Willingness to post collateral 
 
The act of posting collateral reduces the lender’s risk of suffering a loss should the 
entrepreneur default on the loan. In addition, it is a signal to the bank that the 
applicant believes that the project is viable and will endeavour to make it a success. 
It is an indicator from the borrower’s perspective of commitment to the project. One 
might expect that entrepreneurs influenced by the Escalation of Commitment bias 
would be more willing to post collateral. The loan officer’s post due diligence findings 
that the project is more risky than initially expected and will require collateral might 
further entrench this entrepreneur’s commitment. The positive relationship that 
emerged between evidence of the Escalation of Commitment bias and willingness to 
post collateral at the established entrepreneurial level, though minor, gives support 
to this scenario. 
 
A relationship at the nascent entrepreneurial level was slighter more evident. 
Nascent entrepreneurs in a necessity driven environment with few employment 
alternatives might further entrench themselves in funding decisions for several 
reasons: 
 They may view their willingness to commit as sending a strong signal to the 












 They often do not have the collateral available, thus there is no real loss to 
them should the business fail. 
 
If it is known by the lending institution that the entrepreneur is not influenced by the 
Escalation of Commitment bias, it is likely that the applicant will be less willing to 
post collateral. Thus greater willingness to post collateral should not necessarily be 
regarded as a signal that the project is viable and rests on strictly rational 
foundations. In fact, it might be a signal that further investigation into the viability of 
the project is recommended.  
 
4.6.5. Escalation of Commitment findings implications 
 
The relationships that emerged indicate that the alternative sources of data 
generated can supplement the existing lending technologies within the framework of 
the Escalation of Commitment bias. Limited support for hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 was 
revealed. These findings seem to be more relevant amongst established 
entrepreneurs in the instances that the lending institution relies on SBCS or financial 
statement lending. Where the SBCS or financial information was not sufficient to 
yield a clear creditworthiness decision, evidence of the Escalation of Commitment 
bias within the more established entrepreneur’s decision making process might 
further reduce the information opacity. 
 
Where the lending institution relies on relationship lending, the alternative sources of 
data may provide more comfort when assessing nascent entrepreneurs. This finding 
however includes a discouraging drawback. Relationship lending typically occurs 
when the lending institution already has a credit history with the loan applicant. The 
loan officer cannot rely on a past relationship where none has occurred. 
Consequently, additional information on the likelihood of a nascent applicant making 
rational decisions cannot reduce the level of decision uncertainty within a 
relationship lending framework. The loan officer is forced to assess the 
entrepreneur’s application with other lending technologies which seem to be less 














4.7. Lack of Counterfactual Thinking 
 
4.7.1 Correlation insights 
 
With regard to all questions included in the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking case 
study, the response mean did not closely approximate three and the response 
distribution as evident in histograms in Figure 4.2 was not normal.  
 
All questions rendered a high degree of consensus of action whether by way of 
demonstrating the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking bias or the opposite. This may 
mean that the questions did not test respondent’s degree of predisposition to risk 
taking sufficiently or that certain scenarios test simultaneously for low risk and high 














ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence












Figure 4.2 Lack of Counterfactual Thinking histograms 
 
 
It is likely that the questions included in the case study elicited responses that did not 
test exclusively for Counterfactual Thinking or a lack thereof. By treating all low risk 
choices as a 1 (answers of 1 and 2 on the 5 Point Likert scale) and all high risk 
answers as a 2 (answers of 4 or 5 on the Likert scale), a comparison of respondents 
to questions LC3 and LC5 reveals that 49 of the fifty exhibited a lack of 
counterfactual thinking in LC3 and simultaneously presence of counterfactual 
thinking in LC5. 
 
In terms of Lack of Counterfactual Thinking risk predispositions, Table 4.8 




















Table 4.8. Lack of Counterfactual Thinking bias – contradictory responses 
 
Examples of contradictory positions taken among differing question sets 
(N = 50) 
Question 
sets 















The results do not lend themselves to analysing or concluding as to the presence or 
absence of the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking bias amongst loan applicants. It thus 
becomes impractical to determine whether correlations between the Lack of 
Counterfactual Thinking bias and the other variables under scrutiny exist. It was not 
possible to re-examine the loan applicants that formed part of the research fieldwork 
for the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking bias. Nor was it possible to extend the 
questionnaire using new loan applicants without incurring considerable delay and 
little assurance of successfully sourcing willing participants. Due to the high level of 
contradictory stances in this particular case study and the difficulties in re-performing 
this specific test, Lack of Counterfactual Thinking will not be advanced as a variable 
towards developing an overall predisposition to risk taking score utilizing evidence of 
cognitive biases within the context of this study. The purpose of the research was not 
to determine whether the Lack of Counterfactual Thinking bias exclusively could give 
further creditworthiness insights beyond the limitations of current lending 
technologies. Nevertheless, evidence of the bias may yet offer insights and useful 
intuition into the creditworthiness of SMME entrepreneurs and is mentioned as an 
item worthy of future research based on past research included in the literature 

















4.8. Illusion of Control 
 
Table 4.9 indicates that at an overall sample population level, no strong correlations 
emerged between the illusions of control bias and any of the other constructs under 
investigation though there were minor and strong correlations that warrant further 
discussion in certain cases, particularly when analysed at a stratified sample level. 
These will be analysed within the context of each of the existing lending 
technologies. 
 
4.8.1. Correlation insights 
 
Table 4.9. Illusion of Control – Spearman correlation coefficients 
 
Illusion of Control Small Business 
Credit Scoring 
Financial Statement lending  Relationship 
lending 
 Delphi Commercial 
Numeracy 
Usage of Financial 
information 
Overconfidence Willingness to post 
collateral 
Overall Sample 0.075  0.267  0.049  0.184  0.029  
Established 
entrepreneurs 
0.026  0.054  0.017  0.128  -0.092  
Nascent 
Entrepreneurs 






ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence












4.8.2. Illusion of Control and Small Business Credit Scoring 
 
The Spearman correlation test yielded no relationship between the Delphi score and 
evidence of the Illusion of Control bias. Findings of a Chi-Square test are presented 
in Table 4.10. A minor trend is reflected when analysing the scores within three 
broad groupings, particularly among the lower scoring applicants. 
 
The relationship seemed to be more evident amongst entrepreneurs with lower 
Delphi scores. These applicants generally seemed to be more influenced by the 
Illusion of Control bias. 
  
Table 4.10 Illusion of Control – Delphi Score Chi-Square Test 
 
 
Entrepreneurs labouring under the Illusion of Control bias may assume that external 
factors such as interest rates and asset market values will move in their favour. Loan 
terms will therefore seem more appealing and achievable. When the variables 
1 -.2 and less 2 -.2 - .2 3 .2 and more
Count 7 5 1 13
Expected Count 4.9 3.9 4.2 13.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
53.8% 38.5% 7.7% 100.0%
% within IC_SELECT_CAT IC 
SELECT CAT
36.8% 33.3% 6.3% 26.0%
Count 8 5 12 25
Expected Count 9.5 7.5 8.0 25.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
32.0% 20.0% 48.0% 100.0%
% within IC_SELECT_CAT IC 
SELECT CAT
42.1% 33.3% 75.0% 50.0%
Count 4 5 3 12
Expected Count 4.6 3.6 3.8 12.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
33.3% 41.7% 25.0% 100.0%
% within IC_SELECT_CAT IC 
SELECT CAT
21.1% 33.3% 18.8% 24.0%
Count 19 15 16 50
Expected Count 19.0 15.0 16.0 50.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
38.0% 30.0% 32.0% 100.0%
% within IC_SELECT_CAT IC 
SELECT CAT
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 7.437a 4 .115
Likelihood Ratio 8.196 4 .085
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.375 1 .241
N of Valid Cases 50
Crosstab
 Illusions of Control CAT
Total
experiancat Experian cat 1 584 and less
2 585 - 590
3 591 and higher
Total
Chi-Square Tests












remain constant or deteriorate, these entrepreneurs may be placed in a position 
where they are forced to default on their loans. 
 
When screening entrepreneurs for creditworthiness, it may be useful for the loan 
officer to have additional insights into the payment prospects of loan applicants. 
Given a stronger correlation between the Delphi score or other credit rating agency 
score, screening for the Illusion of Control bias might give the loan officer more 
evidence of creditworthiness, where an inconclusive Delphi score emerged. 
 
4.8.3. Illusion of Control and financial statement lending 
 
Relationships emerged between the Illusion of Control bias and both the 
entrepreneur’s commercial numeracy skills and their level of overconfidence. These 
correlations were more evident at the nascent entrepreneurial level. 
 
4.8.3.1. Commercial numeracy 
 
No relationship emerged between commercial numeracy at the established 
entrepreneurial level though at a nascent entrepreneurial level, a strong relationship 
(0.530) was revealed. This was found to be significant at the 0.01 level. This 
indicates that amongst nascent entrepreneurs with an understanding of basic 
financial calculations and concepts, their decisions are less influenced by 
uncontrollable external factors.  
 
As an example, a nascent entrepreneur may have recently calculated the direct and 
overhead costs of the stock that will be merchandised. Whilst the current costs are 
available, the entrepreneur will not assume that the more volatile inputs such as 
transport costs will remain unchanged and margin for short term increases will be 
considered. The nascent entrepreneur who lacks these commercial skills may 
anticipate that variations in external costs will not affect their product costs or will 
always be of benefit to them. The costing calculations are therefore seen as overly 













When reviewing a nascent entrepreneurial business plan, this finding may be of 
great significance to a loan officer. If it is known beforehand that the applicant is 
influenced by the Illusion of Control bias, several assumptions that are used in the 
projection of revenues and profits might be carefully reconsidered given the 




Amongst nascent entrepreneurs, a minor correlation emerged between the Illusion of 
Control bias and overconfidence (0.236), though the correlation was not within 
meaningful significance levels. The less influenced by the Illusion of Control bias, the 
more overconfident the entrepreneur appeared to be.  
 
This relationship seems understandable, particularly amongst nascent entrepreneurs 
where the entrepreneur is likely to have little experience in dealing with external 
factors. Overconfidence when making a rational decision relating to a transaction 
that is dependent on factors beyond the entrepreneur’s ability to influence may be 
appropriate, particularly when third party funding is at stake. However, this 
relationship may be of concern should it result in the inability to act. Overconfidence 
should not extend to a dismissal of all relevant information in favour of simply 
regarding controllable factors as beyond one’s ability to influence. Should the 
nascent entrepreneur anticipate that market forces are too unpredictable to initiate 
planned activities, rather than consult with the appropriate parties to reduce market 
uncertainty, opportunities may be lost. 
 
Loan officer’s knowledge of the applicant’s predisposition to the Overconfidence bias 
may give insight into the development of the business plan and prospects of the 
nascent entrepreneur. A stronger correlation with the Illusion of Control bias would 
indicate that the entrepreneur is not susceptible to taking excessive risks on 
uncontrollable market forces. This might be a favourable factor amongst 
entrepreneurs who utilize and understand financial information. Amongst 














4.8.4. Illusion of Control findings implications 
 
The relationships that emerged indicate that the alternative sources of data 
generated can supplement the existing lending technologies within the framework of 
the Illusion of Control bias. Support for hypothesis 3 was revealed. Whilst there 
seemed to be little additional support for SBCS, financial institutions that rely 
primarily on financial statements may gain further certainty on an individual’s 
creditworthiness by having insight into evidence of the Illusion of Control bias. 
Contrary to the evidence that emerged within the Escalation of Commitment bias, 
this relationship was more apparent amongst nascent entrepreneurs. 
 
The findings are particularly useful when the creditworthiness decision is to be 
largely based on the presentation of financial statements, budgets and management 
accounts and the applicant is a nascent entrepreneur. Where the nascent 
entrepreneur is able to present budgets and forecasts, and is not overly influenced 
by the Illusion of Control bias, the loan officer might be able to place further reliance 
on the presented figures. Alternatively, where it is known that a nascent entrepreneur 
is chronically influenced by the Illusion of Control bias, forecasts should be more 
suspiciously considered. This relationship was not found amongst established 
entrepreneurs. In these instances, where uncertainty around the integrity of the 





























4.9.1. Correlation insights 
 
Table 4.11 indicates that at an overall sample population level, no strong correlations 
emerged between the Planning Fallacy bias and any of the other constructs under 
investigation though there were minor and moderate (often unexpected) correlations 
that warrant further discussion in certain cases. These will be analysed within the 
context of each of the existing lending technologies. 
 
Table 4.11. Planning Fallacy – Spearman correlation coefficients 
Planning Fallacy Small Business 
Credit Scoring 
Financial Statement lending  Relationship 
lending 
 Delphi Commercial 
Numeracy 
Usage of Financial 
information 
Overconfidence Willingness to post 
collateral 
Overall Sample -0.207  0.056  -0.022  0.144  0.000  
Established 
entrepreneurs 
-0.281  0.005  -0.347  -0.257  -0.010  
Nascent 
Entrepreneurs 






ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence












4.9.2. Planning Fallacy and Small Business Credit Scoring 
 
Minor correlations were found between the Delphi credit score and the Planning 
Fallacy score at the overall sample level (-0.207) though Hypothesis 1 was not 
supported. This relationship was largely due to findings at the established 
entrepreneurial level (-0.281). At the nascent level, the relationship was largely 
inconclusive. A Chi –Square test was performed to further analyse the relationship 
between the Planning Fallacy bias and the Delphi score. Though the sample size is 
too small to conclude as to the statistical significance of the relationship, findings are 
included in Table 4.12. 
 
The Chi-Square test indicates that entrepreneurs with the lower Delphi Credit scores 
tended to be more influenced by the Planning Fallacy bias. However applicants with 
higher Delphi scores tended to score less conclusively in the Planning Fallacy test 
suggesting that they were neither overly nor slightly influenced by the Planning 
Fallacy bias. A counterintuitive relationship emerged amongst the more established 
group where applicants with better credit scores seemed to make more irrational 
decisions. The finding may describe the entrepreneur who has in the past achieved 



























Table 4.12 Planning Fallacy – Delphi Score Chi-Square Test 
 
 
It is not clear whether this finding is indicative of a trend in the entrepreneurial 
population or whether the test for the Planning Fallacy bias was dysfunctional. The 
inconclusive nature of the results both within the Planning Fallacy bias and relative to 
the relationships that emerged with the other cognitive biases may suggest that 
respondents may have misinterpreted the questions. Alternatively, elements within 
the Planning Fallacy cognitive bias cause entrepreneurs to make markedly different 
risk based decisions than they would when influenced by the other cognitive biases 
under scrutiny. 
 
The absolute cumulative mean of the Planning Fallacy questions was higher than the 
other cognitive biases (Table 4.1). It thus seems that entrepreneurs are influenced 
by the Planning Fallacy bias though the correlations that emerged both with the 
Delphi score, financial numeracy and other cognitive biases largely contradicted the 
pattern that had been established by the other cognitive biases in the study. . 
Regarding the other cognitive biases, rational decision makers seemed to make 
1 -.2 and less 2 -.2 - .2 3 .2 and more
Count 8 2 3 13
Expected Count 5.2 4.7 3.1 13.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
61.5% 15.4% 23.1% 100.0%
% within PF_SELECT_CAT 
PF SELECT CAT
40.0% 11.1% 25.0% 26.0%
Count 8 8 9 25
Expected Count 10.0 9.0 6.0 25.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
32.0% 32.0% 36.0% 100.0%
% within PF_SELECT_CAT 
PF SELECT CAT
40.0% 44.4% 75.0% 50.0%
Count 4 8 0 12
Expected Count 4.8 4.3 2.9 12.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
33.3% 66.7% .0% 100.0%
% within PF_SELECT_CAT 
PF SELECT CAT
20.0% 44.4% .0% 24.0%
Count 20 18 12 50
Expected Count 20.0 18.0 12.0 50.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
40.0% 36.0% 24.0% 100.0%
% within PF_SELECT_CAT 
PF SELECT CAT
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 11.206a 4 .024
Likelihood Ratio 13.501 4 .009
Linear-by-Linear Association .045 1 .832
N of Valid Cases 50
Crosstab
 Planning Fallacy CAT
Total
experiancat Experian cat 1 584 and less
2 585 - 590
3 591 and higher
Total
Chi-Square Tests












better credit decisions and generally were more financially capable. The Planning 
Fallacy bias findings contradicted these trends and are deserving of further scrutiny 
though it is beyond the scope of the current research undertaking. A larger sample is 
required to re-examine this relationship at both the established and nascent 
entrepreneurial level.  
 
Robust evidence of the Planning Fallacy bias within a loan applicant may serve as 
additional evidence to bolster an ambiguous Delphi credit score. This is particularly 
true at the nascent entrepreneurial level where credit scores, in the absence of rich 
credit histories, may often be uninformative. Knowledge that the applicant sets 
unrealistic targets may serve as a signal to a likely pattern of debt repayments. 
However, given the counterintuitive findings, this construct needs to be investigated 
further before the findings are confirmed. 
 
4.9.3. Planning Fallacy and financial statement lending 
 
Minor correlations emerged between the Planning Fallacy bias and both the 
entrepreneurs’ usage of financial information and their level of overconfidence. 
 
4.9.3.1. Level of Usage of Financial Information 
 





At an established entrepreneurial level, applicants who made more use of financial 
information were more influenced by the Planning Fallacy bias (-0.347). These more 
experienced entrepreneurs seem less likely to analyse their projections and results 
and are also surprisingly less likely to formulate unachievable financial or operational 
goals. This insight was contrary to Hypothesis 3 and opposes the findings of the 













This anomaly may be understood in terms of the more experienced nature of the 
entrepreneur. When competing for a loan, the applicant is incentivized to advance 
the specific project to the loan officer as producing the required cashflows within an 
extremely efficient timeframe. Armed with the necessary financial reports, this task 
may seem more achievable. Financial information usage therefore becomes a 
reinforcing mechanism. As the entrepreneur attempts to set more difficult targets, 
financial information is examined or prepared in an attempt to justify the revisions. 
This explanation adds to the finding by von Blottnitz (2009) that SMME 
entrepreneurs are prone to manipulating their financial statements to reflect more 
favourable positions. However, it is doubtful whether these entrepreneurs would rely 
on manipulated and intentionally misleading information for internal decision making 
purposes. 
 
This insight may be important to lending institutions. If the loan officer is able to 
establish that the applicant regularly reviews financial information, it may serve as a 
signal that the project deadlines and thresholds inherent in the business plan may be 
overly demanding. Since the evidence indicates that established entrepreneurs who 





Amongst nascent entrepreneurs, evidence of a relationship contrary to that of the 
established entrepreneurs emerged (0.178), though this correlation was well outside 
of meaningful significance levels. Nascent entrepreneurs less influenced by the 
Planning Fallacy bias seemed more likely to regularly use financial information. It is 
likely that financial information is limited to business plans and forecasts. Regular 
usage of these reports might suggest that achievable targets have been set. This 
insight is equally important to lending institutions – if the loan officer is able to 
ascertain that the entrepreneur makes use of financial information, it can serve as a 

















The weak relationship at the overall sample population level (0.144) suggests that 
the more an applicant is inclined to taking risky decisions, the less overconfidence 
that applicant will exhibit. More interesting are the divergent correlation coefficients 
at the stratified sample level. This relationship manifests itself at the population level 
due to a much stronger correlation at the nascent entrepreneurial level (0.411). This 
correlation was found to be significant at the 0.05 level. A weaker relationship in the 
opposite direction was uncovered at the established entrepreneurial level (-0.257). 




The evidence suggests that at a nascent entrepreneurial level, applicants who 
assume that unrealistic goals can be achieved with limited time and resources will 
not be overconfident in those beliefs. This finding is understandable. Having little 
experience, entrepreneurs would not be expected to factor all of the variables and 
possible pitfalls into a planned project. The corresponding low level of 
overconfidence amongst these excessively biased entrepreneurs is perhaps an 




Established entrepreneurs are more inclined to exhibit overconfidence when they 
have projected unrealistically achievable goals. This may be a projection to external 
parties of the ability of the entrepreneur to achieve more than is normally possible. 
Alternatively, this relationship may be an indication of the entrepreneur’s past proven 
and impressive capabilities. 
 
The relationship is a useful one from the perspective of a bank loan officer screening 
a loan application. Where Planning Fallacy is evident, this may be a signal to the 
loan officer that the entrepreneur, if nascent, will be open to revising the project 












evidence of past achievements in meeting project deadlines might be investigated to 
determine whether the Planning Fallacy bias is misplaced. 
 
4.9.4. Planning Fallacy and Relationship Lending 
 
No correlations were evident between the Planning Fallacy and willingness to post 
collateral. One might have expected nascent entrepreneurs influenced by the 
Planning Fallacy bias (particularly those without collateral) to be more willing to post 
collateral. It was anticipated that necessity based entrepreneurship is likely to lead to 
greater desperation to start trading. Alternatively, established entrepreneurs 
uninfluenced by the Planning Fallacy bias were expected to be less willing to post 
collateral. Their experiences with the inherent difficulties in forging a profitable 
enterprise were expected to temper their willingness to put their personal assets at 
risk. However, an analysis of the data yielded neither of these results.  
 
4.9.5. Planning Fallacy findings implications 
 
While the relationships that emerged indicate that the alternative sources of data 
generated can supplement the existing lending technologies within the framework of 
the Planning Fallacy bias, Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 were not supported. Whilst there 
seemed to be counterintuitive support for SBCS and financial statement lending, 
behavioural finance insights seemed to offer no further certainty within the sphere of 
relationship lending. Evidence suggested that more irrational entrepreneurs were 
likely to yield better credit scores and the established entrepreneurs who made little 
use of financial information made more rational decisions. Financial statement based 
lending to nascent entrepreneurs may be supported based on the overconfidence 
findings. 
 
Given the seemingly tenuous correlations, insights into the Planning Fallacy bias 
should be cautiously utilised by loan officers. Future research may further clarify the 
relationships, particularly those that seem at odds with the correlations that emerged 















4.10. Excessive Optimism 
 
4.10.1. Correlation insights 
 






Financial Statement lending  Relationship 
lending 
 Delphi Commercial 
Numeracy 
Usage of Financial 
information 
Overconfidence Willingness to post 
collateral 
Overall Sample 0.189  -0.149  -0.049  0.072  -0.175  
Established 
entrepreneurs 
0.102  -0.185  0.118  0.129  -0.265  
Nascent 
Entrepreneurs 
0.174  -0.126  -0.145  0.051  -0.101  
 
Table 4.13 indicates that at an overall sample population level, no strong correlations 
emerged between the Excessive Optimism bias and any of the other constructs 
under investigation though there were minor correlations that warrant further 
discussion in certain cases. These will be analysed within the context of each of the 






ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
 - Illusions of Control
 - Planning Fallacy
 - Excessive Optimism
 - Overconfidence












4.10.2. Excessive Optimism and Small Business Credit Scoring 
 
The Spearman test revealed a minor correlation (0.189) between entrepreneurs 
influenced by the Excessive Optimism bias and their respective Delphi credit score. 
Given the abnormality of the Delphi score distribution, the correlation was not 
expected to be very strong. At the nascent (0.174) and established entrepreneurial 
level (0.102) this was found to be the case. In all instances, correlations were outside 
of meaningful significance levels. 
 
Results of a Chi-Square test are included in Table 4.14. Though the sample size was 
not large enough to conclude on the significance of any relationships, it further 
describes the correlations presented in Table 4.13. Applicants who scored lower in 
the Delphi score were more likely to take riskier decisions. 
 
Table 4.14. Excessive Optimism – Delphi Score Chi-Square Test 
 
 
1 -.2 and less 2 -.2 - .2 3 .2 and more
Count 8 5 0 13
Expected Count 5.5 3.9 3.6 13.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
61.5% 38.5% .0% 100.0%
% within EO_SELECT_CAT 
EO SELECT CAT
38.1% 33.3% .0% 26.0%
Count 8 6 11 25
Expected Count 10.5 7.5 7.0 25.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
32.0% 24.0% 44.0% 100.0%
% within EO_SELECT_CAT 
EO SELECT CAT
38.1% 40.0% 78.6% 50.0%
Count 5 4 3 12
Expected Count 5.0 3.6 3.4 12.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
41.7% 33.3% 25.0% 100.0%
% within EO_SELECT_CAT 
EO SELECT CAT
23.8% 26.7% 21.4% 24.0%
Count 21 15 14 50
Expected Count 21.0 15.0 14.0 50.0
% within experiancat Experian 
cat
42.0% 30.0% 28.0% 100.0%
% within EO_SELECT_CAT 
EO SELECT CAT
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 8.396a 4 .078
Likelihood Ratio 11.595 4 .021
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.980 1 .159
N of Valid Cases 50
Crosstab
 Excessive Optimism CAT
Total
experiancat Experian cat 1 584 and less
2 585 - 590
3 591 and higher
Total
Chi-Square Tests












The relationship that emerged was intuitively expected and was emphasized 
amongst applicants with lower Delphi credit score. Those applicants, who tend to 
take more irrational decisions within the Excessive Optimism construct, seemed to 
have worse credit histories. They will assume that all aspects of their business plan 
will eventuate in the best possible scenarios and will act according to this fallacy. 
This may result in the entrepreneurs overextending themselves with debt burdens 
that they cannot afford. 
 
This information may be useful to lending officials who have received ambiguous 
credit scores for specific loan applicants. Where the score may not assist with the 
creditworthiness decision, knowledge that the applicants were likely to have forecast 
revenues in an overly optimistic light may give evidence of an inability to service debt 
repayments in the future if the targeted revenues cannot possibly be achieved. 
 
4.10.3. Excessive Optimism and Financial Statement lending 
 
Neither commercial numeracy skills, regularity of usage of financial information nor 
overconfidence had a clear correlation with the Excessive Optimism bias. This 
indicates that knowledge that an entrepreneur is influenced by the Excessive 
Optimism bias may not effectively clarify a loan officer’s creditworthiness decision 
within a financial statement lending framework. This is surprising. Given the 
plausibility of excessive optimism leading to inflated forecasting, it seems that 
insights into the loan applicants tendency to be influenced by the Excessive 
Optimism bias would be advantageous.  
 
An analysis of the data however indicated that applicants influenced by the 
Excessive Optimism bias were not less commercially numerate. The financial 
statements presented to the loan officer were not more or less likely to be 
inaccurate. In addition, excessively optimistic entrepreneurs were no more or less 
likely to be regular users of financial information. Whilst one might have argued that 
these entrepreneurs would be less inclined to dwell on disappointing results, it is 














4.10.4. Excessive Optimism and Relationship based lending 
 
The minor relationship that emerged between the Excessive Optimism bias and 
willingness to post collateral (-0.175) suggests that established entrepreneurs (-
0.265) influenced by the Excessive Optimism bias are less willing to post collateral. 
Conversely, less biased entrepreneurs seemed more willing to offer collateral. The 
correlations were not found to be significant within meaningful significance limits. 
This relationship does however indicate that the more irrational decision makers 
within the Excessive Optimism construct were not as prepared to risk their own 
capital. 
 
This insight might have been particularly useful to lending institutions if it were shown 
to be evident within meaningful significance levels. If it can be ascertained that the 
more established entrepreneur is willing to post collateral, this may in turn indicate 
that the projections that have been presented as part of the business plan have not 
been overly optimistic. This in turn reinforces the reliance that can be placed on the 
achievability of the project. Given this extra assurance, lending institutions might be 
placed in a situation where they can reduce collateral demands in certain instances. 
 
4.10.5. Excessive Optimism findings implications 
 
The relationships that emerged indicate that the alternative sources of data 
generated can supplement the existing lending technologies within the framework of 
the Excessive Optimism bias though to a more limited degree. Tenuous support for 
Hypotheses 1 and 4 emerged. The Spearman and Chi-Square tests indicated that 
behavioural finance insights can support the creditworthiness decision when the 
primary lending technology utilised is SBCS. The data analysis also indicated that 
alternative forms of creditworthiness information may also support relationship based 
lending where established entrepreneurs are applying for finance. However, no 
evidence emerged suggesting that these alternative sources of information would 
further clarify a financial statement based lending decision.  
 
This SBSC insight seemed to be particularly useful at an established entrepreneurial 












entrepreneur has a richer credit history, further decision making insights may reduce 
any remaining creditworthiness uncertainty. Nascent entrepreneurs seemed to have 
more limited credit histories and less informative credit scores exacerbating the 
uncertainty surrounding the loan decision and the importance of alternative forms of 
creditworthiness information. 
 
With regard to Relationship Based Lending, the data analysis suggested that 
alternative forms of creditworthiness information were relevant within an established 
entrepreneurial context. This insight coincides with the applicability of the lending 
technology largely to established entrepreneurs since they are more likely to have a 





4.11.1. Correlation insights 
 






Financial Statement lending Relationship 
lending 
(Overconfidence) Delphi Commercial 
Numeracy 




Overall Sample 0.070  0.064  0.423  0.226  
Established 
entrepreneurs 
0.578  0.105  0.418  0.098  
Nascent 
Entrepreneurs 
-0.313  0.057  0.355  -0.502  
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Table 4.15 indicates that at an overall sample population level, no strong correlations 
emerged between the Overconfidence bias and any of the other constructs under 
investigation at the overall sample level, including those within Financial Statement 
lending. Minor, moderate and strong correlations that emerged at the stratified 
sample levels warrant further discussion. These will be analysed within the context of 
each of the existing lending technologies. 
 
4.11.2. Overconfidence and Small Business Credit Scoring 
 
Amongst established entrepreneurs, evidence strongly suggests that applicants who 
were more overconfident had better credit histories (0.578). This correlation was 
significant within the 0.01 level. Given that overconfident entrepreneurs are less 
likely to take advice from others (Gardner and Berry; 1995), this relationship may 
suggest that these applicants are less likely to be influenced by third parties to enter 
into risky ventures. Conversely, one might posit, that less overconfident, more 
established applicants enter into more risky credit transactions without consulting 
with experts assuming that they will be able to make the unaffordable repayments. 
Since many applicants in the population have scant credit histories, it would seem 
that most of these established entrepreneurs did not enter into risky credit 
agreements, countering this second alternative. Amongst nascent entrepreneurs, a 
moderate relationship emerged in the hypothesised direction. This indicates that 
nascent entrepreneurs that exhibit symptoms of overconfidence are more likely to 
have poor credit histories. These entrepreneurs, convinced of their own decision 
making abilities, may be susceptible to acting alone and while still inexperienced.  
 
Both the correlations with the SBCS and the contrasting relationships that emerged 
between the two entrepreneurial samples may offer useful insights into 
creditworthiness decisions. Assessing for overconfidence alone might serve as a 
more sophisticated mechanism to determine whether the loan applicant was likely to 
cooperate with the lending institution. Prior to the evidence that emerged, one might 
have assumed that this would be an indication of progress in the process of reducing 












supporting the overarching hypothesis that behavioural finance insights are useful in 
the creditworthiness decision, further suggests that markedly different signals must 
be interpreted depending on whether the entrepreneur is considered to be nascent 
or more established.  
 
Where the presence of overconfidence  in an established applicant might be viewed 
by a lending officer as an indicator of riskiness, this evidence suggests that the 
converse may be true. While they may be reluctant to take advice from the loan 
officer, overconfident applicants seem to be more likely to make the required debt 
repayment. Nascent entrepreneurs however seem to be more risky prospects where 
evidence of overconfidence is found. 
 
In both instances, where an applicant with a limited credit history might have an 
uninformative credit score, information of this nature might afford the lending 
institution further clarity. 
 
4.11.3. Overconfidence and Financial Statement lending 
 
The relationship between overconfidence and regularity of usage of financial 
information (0.423) emerged as marginally more evident amongst established 
(0.418) than nascent entrepreneurs (0.355). Correlations at the overall and 
established levels were significant within 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. Initially, 
one might have thought that overconfident entrepreneurs made less usage of 
financial information since they believe that they already know the facts. In both 
cases however, evidence of the opposite relationship emerged. More regular users 
of financial information were more likely to be overconfident. Alternative theories will 
be explored as to the direction of causation. 
 
Regularity of usage of financial information makes the decision maker overconfident  
 
As the entrepreneur consistently refers to financial information, a sense of 
confidence is gained in the decision making process. It is likely that established 












exposure to this causal process. In fact, the correlation was found to be stronger 




Overconfident decision makers regularly review financial information to support their 
decisions 
 
The entrepreneur, having previously decided on a course of action, will look to 
financial information both prior to and after the decision to justify the decision. This 
causal direction is indicative of the Escalation of Commitment bias. However, the 
opposite relationship emerged amongst established entrepreneurs who seemed to 
be less influenced by the Escalation of Commitment bias. 
 
Evidence therefore seems to suggest that more regular usage of financial 
information causes one to exhibit greater signs of overconfidence. 
 
4.11.3.1 Overconfident applicants and financial information 
 
Currently, lending institutions are unlikely to grant loans to organizations that do not 
provide the mandated financial information. When considering financial information 
requirements, lending institutions should differentiate between those entrepreneurs 
who are unwilling to disclose accurate information and those who are unable (Table 
4.16). 
 
Table 4.16 Willingness and Ability to provide financial information 
Provision of financial 
information 
Able Unable 
Willing (A) Least uncertainty (B) Uncertain 
Unwilling (C) Uncertain (D) Most uncertainty 
 
Willing and able applicants (A) will generally be methodically evaluated for loans. 
Unwilling and unable applicants (D) will generally not be evaluated for loans. The 












providing financial information is one of the factors underpinning the SMME credit 
mismatch. Lending institutions might further analyse entrepreneurs that can provide 
financial information but are unwilling to (C) as well as those who are unable to, but 
would if they were able (B).  
 
It is suggested that overconfident entrepreneurs fall into the (C) quadrant. 
Overconfident individuals are less prone to ask for advice, as they value their own 
judgements over those of the loan officers. It is suggested that they will therefore be 
less forthcoming with all of the required financial information. Evidence from the 
correlation analyses indicates that entrepreneurs that were more influenced by the 
overconfidence bias were more likely to make use of financial information. In 
addition, more overconfident entrepreneurs seemed to be generally less susceptible 
to influence by other cognitive biases. 
 
Quadrant B 
Nascent entrepreneurs were more overconfident on average than established 
entrepreneurs and also professed to make slightly more regular use of financial 
information (Table 4.17). In addition, the evidence suggests that nascent 
entrepreneurs with commercial numeracy skills were more likely to make rational 
decisions (Table 4.18). If it is ascertained that nascent entrepreneurs have an 
understanding of the financial concepts but lack the ability to present the information 
regularly, the loan officer might give pause to further analyse whether the current 
presentation constraints can be easily overcome. Once a loan has been granted, 
these entrepreneurs may prioritize the sourcing of the necessary skills and resources 
to generate financial information. 
 
 
Table 4.17 Overconfidence and Financial information usage 
 Overconfidence Financial usage 
 (-1 to +1) (0 - 1) 
Overall sample 0.288 0.813 
More established 0.149 0.775 













The drawback to nascent entrepreneurial willingness to provide financial information 
is that the information might be misleading when presented. Where the entrepreneur 
is overconfident concerning the firm’s prospects of success, and a financial 
institution is less exuberant, an increased incentive exists to misreport. If not done 
overtly, the entrepreneur might unprofessionally compile all the positive information 
that resources allow in order to portray a more positive set of results. Nascent 
entrepreneurs might also be less aware of the regulatory prohibitions and penalties 
concerning financial misrepresentation. Laux and Stocken (2010) posited that the 
heightened risk of deviant reporting based litigation might in fact exacerbate the level 
of managerial misreporting.  
 
Concerning nascent entrepreneurs, loan officers will be less concerned that their 
applicants are willingly withholding financial information. Rather, they are unable to 
present the required reports due to lack of skills or resources. However, should that 
information be presented, the loan officers must be cognisant of the entrepreneur’s 
incentive to (willingly or unwillingly) portray misleadingly positive information. 
 
Quadrant C 
Individuals influenced by the overconfidence bias are less willing to value the 
insights of others. The lending institution might anticipate that the entrepreneurs who 
do not willingly share financial information are overconfident of their own abilities and 
consequently do not need the opinions or insights of employees of the bank. 
Overconfidence might therefore be considered a risky trait from the perspective of 
the lending institution. In fact, overconfident entrepreneurs seem to make more use 
of financial information when making decisions. Their overconfidence might in fact be 
a demonstration of self efficacy – they are confident of their own decisions and do 
not wish to jeopardise the decision making process through inclusion of those they 
perceive to be less experienced and competent in their specific fields. This, along 
with their tendency to make more rational decisions, might actually serve as a 
creditworthiness signal. 
 
Alternatively, one needs to consider the established entrepreneur that is applying for 
needed finance and has no choice but to supply the requested information to qualify 












incentive to provide only the most positive information. Laux and Stocken (2010) 
acknowledge the probability that the entrepreneur possesses private information and 
withholds unfavourable news. Schrand and Zechman (2011) found that 
overconfident executives were more likely to initially overstate earning (optimistically 
rather than intentionally) causing a greater likelihood of ultimately intentionally 
misstating results. 
 
The loan officer must in the case of established entrepreneurs assess whether all 
information that has been requested is provided. Where the established 
entrepreneur exhibits the influence of overconfidence, the difficulty will be in 
determining whether only selective information that may negatively affect the 
application has been withheld or whether it is a reluctance stemming from an innate 
belief that the enough information has been presented and the business is not in 
need of additional advice or opinions. 
 
In both these instances, evidence of influence by cognitive biases may serve as an 
indicator that the loan applicant is not necessarily a credit risk based only on an 
inability or unwillingness to provide all of the required financial reports. 
 
This relationship may be useful to lending institutions. Where overconfidence 
manifests in the applicant’s decision not to include third parties in the management 
decisions of the business, the relationship indicates that the applicants may in fact 
possess and make use of financial information. The applicants can then be strongly 
encouraged to share this information as part of the approval process. 
 
 
4.11.4. Overconfidence and Relationship based lending 
 
Evidence suggests that overconfident nascent entrepreneurs are more likely to be 
willing to post collateral (0.502 correlation coefficient). The correlation was found to 
be significant within the 0.05 level. These entrepreneurs, overly sure of their 
prospects for success, may be willing to demonstrate their conviction through their 
willingness to post collateral. Nascent entrepreneurs are less likely to actually 












relationship did not emerge amongst established entrepreneurs where the potential 
loss may have been more real. 
 
Where overconfidence may have been perceived as a risk exacerbating factor, loan 
officers might be wary of entrepreneurs overly willing to post collateral. This variable 
should be viewed in conjunction with several of the other insights that have emerged 
including evidence of propensity to risk taking through the various cognitive biases. 
 
4.11.5. Overconfidence findings implications 
 
Overconfidence is not linked to risk propensity and is therefore analysed separately 
from the other cognitive biases and the aggregation thereof. The relationships that 
emerged indicate that this alternative source of information can supplement the 
existing lending technologies. Evidence of the converse of Hypothesis 2 was found. 
Financial institutions that rely primarily on financial statement lending may 
nevertheless gain further certainty on an individual’s creditworthiness by having 
insight into evidence of the Overconfidence bias. Overconfidence may be viewed in 
a more contemplative light in that it suggests that entrepreneurs who exhibit the bias 
are more likely to be informed of the venture’s financial situation and understand the 
information. This relationship may suggest that the entrepreneur will be non 
cooperative and conceal known irregularities. Alternatively, the loan officer may also 
determine that the entrepreneur is well informed and signs of non cooperation or 
reticence are not necessarily signals of credit risk. Prior relationships with the 
applicant may assist in clarifying the level of cognitive influence that emerges. 
 
Insights into the applicant’s levels of overconfidence seemed to offer strong support 
for SBCS at the established entrepreneurial level and relationship based lending at 
the nascent level. These insights seem less pragmatically useful since relationship 
lending will rarely apply at the nascent level and SBCS is seen to operate effectively 
at an established entrepreneurial level. Nevertheless, additional clarity is possible 















4.12. CRP score 
 
 
4.12.1. A combination of cognitive biases 
 
Various relationships of differing strengths have emerg d that indicate the suitability 
of individual cognitive biases to the creditworthiness decision. Depending on the 
predominant lending technology and the stage of entrepreneurship, knowledge of the 
level of influence that certain cognitive biases have on the applicant’s decision 
making process may be more informative than others. Ideally, algorithms of the 
optimal combinations of cognitive biases would be developed for these scenarios. 
Many additional variables specific to the sector, risk profile and lending policies of 
the financial institution would need to be considered. This is beyond the scope of the 
current study. The aim is rather to propose and then demonstrate that such 
combinations would be useful. An aggregated score encompassing the four cognitive 




4.12.2. Deriving the CRP score 
 
Two questions from each of the cognitive bias vignette constructs are included in an 
overall cognitive bias risk propensity (CRP) score. These questions are EC3, EC5, 
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EO3, EO4, IC4, IC5, PF1 and PF2. The questions were then combined in a 
mathematical formula: 
 
 {[((((EC3+EC5+EO3+EO4+IC4+IC5+PF1+PF2)-8)*2) / 32) – 1] x -1}  
 
and a score between -1 and 1 was derived. A higher score signified an entrepreneur 
who was generally less influenced by the various cognitive biases. This overall score 
was then correlated with the various other constructs in the research study (Table 
4.3; 4.4 and 4.5). In addition, a chi-test was performed between the CRP score and 
the Delphi credit score for the overall sample population (Table 4.19), as well as 
established entrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs (Table 4.20).   
 
4.12.3. Correlation insights 
 
At an overall sample population level, no strong correlations emerged between the 
CRP composite score and any of the other constructs under investigation though 
there were minor correlations and a moderate correlation that warrant further 
discussion in certain cases. These will be analysed within the context of each of the 
existing lending technologies. 
 





Financial Statement lending  Relationship 
lending 
(CRP Score) Delphi Commercial 
Numeracy 
Usage of Financial 
information 
Overconfidence Willingness to post 
collateral 
Overall Sample 0.200  0.110  0.060  0.240  0.042  
Established 
entrepreneurs 
0.340  -0.059  0.009  0.214  -0.104  
Nascent 
Entrepreneurs 
0.015  0.367  0.130  0.244  0.193  
 
4.12.4. The CRP composite score and Small Business Credit Scoring 
 
At an overall sample population level (Table 4.18), a minor correlation was found 












as a result of responses from the established entrepreneurial level (0.340) and due 
to the positive correlations demonstrated between EC, IC, EO and the Delphi score. 
The correlation was not within the 0.05 significance level however it was within 
meaningful enough bounds (0.121) to suggest pragmatically useful insights. 
 
It is evident from this test at the overall sample level that those entrepreneurs who 
had lower Delphi score tended to be more influenced by one or several of the 
cognitive biases forming part of the overall CRP score. Amongst those entrepreneurs 
with a higher Delphi score, the relationship at the overall sample level is less evident. 
When the nascent entrepreneurs are stratified out, both the Chi test and Spearman 
test reflect a moderate relationship between the CRP score and Delphi score.  
 
Table 4.19. Sample population CRP Score – Delphi Score Chi-Square Test
 
Table 4.20 demonstrates that at this established entrepreneurial level, the 
relationship is more apparent across the range of score groupings. This may be due 
to the richer credit histories expected within more experienced entrepreneurs that 












that more rational decision makers have higher credit scores (possibly as a result of 
better credit decisions in the past) and supports Hypothesis 1. This is driven by a 
more evident correlation within the group of established entrepreneurs and less so 
by the nascent entrepreneurs. 
 
Table 4.20 Established and nascent CRP Score – Delphi Score Chi-Square Test 
 
experii.nCi.t Experii.n Clot· CRP _TAILOLRED_Ci.t CRP TAILORED Clot Crosstabul;Hion 
CRP TAJ LOLRE D CatCRP TAJ LORED cat 
~w1 P6 Status 1- 2 am less 2 -.2- .2 3.2 and mCl:e 
1 EstiiJlished experiarnt Experian cat 1 584 am less Count 
Exp ected Cowt " ~ , U 
% within experi31cat Experian 57.1% 42.9% 0% 
,,' 
% within 50.0% 27.3% 0% 
CRP _ TAJ LOLRED_Cat CRP 
TAJ LORED cat 
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Exp ected Cowt ~ , , , " 
% within experi31cat Experian 18.2% 45.5% ::6 .4% 
,,' 
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TAJ LORED cat 
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,,' 
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4.12.5. The CRP composite score and Financial Statement lending 
 
A minor correlation emerged between commercial numeracy and the CRP (rational 
decision making) score – the more rational decision makers seemed to have a better 
grasp of basic financial concepts. In addition, commercial numeracy and regularity of 
usage of financial information were both noticeably correlated with overconfidence at 
the overall sample level and at the more established and nascent entrepreneurial 
levels. 
 
Usage of financial information 
 
Entrepreneurs that were influenced by a composite of several cognitive biases linked 
to a higher risk propensity were no more or less likely to be regular users of financial 
information. We might speculate that rational decision makers are likely to utilize 
financial information to ensure that as little uncertainty as is reasonably possible 
exists. Conversely, irrational decision makers may utilize financial information to 
substantiate their unreasonable proposal. Table 4.21 demonstrates that minor 
correlations were found and these were often inconsistent when comparing the 
cognitive biases. This suggests that while one may infer financial information usage 






Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 4.516a 4 .341
Likelihood Ratio 5.955 4 .203
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.982 1 .159
N of Valid Cases 25
Pearson Chi-Square 4.636b 4 .327
Likelihood Ratio 4.588 4 .332
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.437 1 .231





a. 9 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.68.












Table 4.21. Spearman’s Correlation coefficients - Cognitive Risk Propensity and Financial Statement lending 
Spearman's 
Correlations 
Usage of financial information Commercial numeracy skills 
 More 
established 





0.243  0.170  0.150  -0.056  0.189  0.052  
Illusions of 
Control 
0.017  0.144  0.049  0.054  0.530  0.267  
Planning Fallacy -0.347  0.178  -0.022  0.005  0.118  0.056  
Excessive 
Optimism 
0.118  -0.145  -0.049  -0.185  -0.126  -0.149  








Minor evidence of a relationship emerged between the entrepreneur’s CRP score 
and level of commercial numeracy at the overall sample and established 
entrepreneurial level. Evidence from Table 4.18 suggested a moderate correlation at 
a nascent entrepreneurial level (0.367) between the CRP score and the 
entrepreneur’s level of commercial numeracy. The correlation was slightly outside of 
the 0.05 significance levels. This indicates that more rational decision makers 
seemed to have a better grasp of basic financial concepts. This relationship is mainly 
underpinned by those entrepreneurs who were influenced by the IC bias, where a 
moderate relationship was demonstrated. 
 
Based on the data analysis, behavioural finance insights may better support financial 
statement lending technologies at the nascent entrepreneurial level. In addition, 
stronger relationships emerged when analysing individual biases than when 
consolidating biases into a composite score. However, lack of financial skills does 
indicate that the nascent entrepreneur is influenced by cognitive biases associated 















4.12.6. CRP score and Relationship based lending 
 
Little evidence of a relationship emerged between the entrepreneur’s CRP score and 
their willingness to offer collateral at the overall sample and established 
entrepreneurial level. Evidence from Table 4.18 suggested a minor correlation 
(0.193) at a nascent entrepreneurial level giving a level of support to Hypothesis 4 
though the correlation was outside of meaningful levels of significance. The 
relationship may indicate that those entrepreneurs who are more influenced by the 
various cognitive biases will be more willing to offer collateral. The correlation 
emerges primarily due to the presence of the Escalation of Commitment bias, which 
yielded a minor correlation at a reasonable level of significance (0.170). 
 
Nascent entrepreneurs’ willingness to post collateral may be linked to their 
propensity to rational decision making. More risk averse decision makers seem to be 
less willing. When comparing the willingness to post collateral variable amongst 
those entrepreneurs that had collateral (Willing and able) and those that didn’t 
(Willing but Unable), it emerged that the entrepreneurs that were more influenced by 
cognitive biases were more likely to offer collateral, particularly if they didn’t have 
any to offer (Willing but Unable). Those that did have collateral and were willing to 
offer it (Willing and Able) were less influenced by cognitive biases. 
 
Willing but Unable 
These applicants may be more willing to take risks since they are not really going to 
suffer financially for any errors that are made. A moral hazard question therefore 
arises. This willingness, coupled with the likelihood of a poor Delphi or CRP score 
serves as a signal to the bank officer of a creditworthiness issue that may augment 
previous knowledge and make the decision to decline the loan more certain. 
 
Alternatively, they may be more willing to take risks given their desperation to 
finance their businesses and commence trading i.e. because they don’t have the 
collateral (assets), they are willing to take greater risks to earn the assets. In fact, 
when analysing the willingness of nascent entrepreneurs to post collateral, to their 












influenced by cognitive biases are more willing to take risky decisions in order to 
secure borrowings than were established entrepreneurs. 
 
Willing and Able 
 
The evidence suggests that applicants who have collateral and are willing to post it 
took less risky business decisions. This is an added vindication to the current 
practice of granting loans on the basis of collateral (the ‘lazy bank’ syndrome). The 
posting of collateral is not only a means to reduce the risk of default, it is in fact a 
signal of the decision making character of the entrepreneur. This insight might afford 
the lending institution the ability to reduce its collateral demands. If the lending 
institution is able to ascertain that the entrepreneur is a rational decision maker, the 
reduced uncertainty may strengthen the relationship. This in turn might negate the 
need for high levels of collateral. 
 
This relationship has limited application at a financial institution level. Relationship 
based lending presupposes a familiarity between the lender and the borrower. Within 
the nascent entrepreneurial context, it is likely that the lender and borrower have no 
prior relationship. Relationship lending is thus not the suggested lending technology 
and alternate forms of creditworthiness information may be superfluous. However, 
knowledge of the loan applicant’s commitment to a project and predisposition to risk 
taking even within this context may prove to be a useful supplement to the principal 
lending technologies. Within the financial statement lending context, the data 
analysis revealed that those nascent entrepreneurial applicants that make more 
usage of financial information seem to be slightly more inclined to post collateral. 
Perhaps now that the entrepreneur has a greater potential loss, more motivation to 
closely monitor the financial results is present. However, this relationship was not 
apparent at the established entrepreneurial level.  
 
An aggregate score encompassing biases that do not seem to have a relationship 
with the one’s willingness to post collateral may not be optimal. Rather, focus should 














4.12.7. Aggregated cognitive bias (CRP score) findings summary 
 
Minor substantiation of Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 emerged. The 
potential for behavioural insights to support the SBCS creditworthiness process 
(Hypothesis 1) emerged primarily at the established entrepreneurial level, while 
financial statement lending (Hypothesis 3) and relationship based lending 
(Hypothesis 5) seemed to have more potential at the nascent entrepreneurial level. 
The contradictory position to hypothesis 2 emerged at the overall and stratified 
sample levels. 
 
Relationships between the various constructs making up the CRP score were more 
noticeable than at the aggregated level. The relationships seem to dilute rather than 
strengthen when the cognitive biases are grouped together into a single score. 
 
 




Several relationships have been identified that lend support to the hypotheses. A 
summary of the findings is presented in Table 4.22. The summary indicates that 
Behavioural Finance insights support the major lending technologies. In several 
cases, the relationships that emerged were minor. The Escalation of Commitment, 
Illusion of Control and Overconfidence biases seemed to yield the most meaningful 
relationships. Within each of the most prevalent lending technologies, a meaningful 
























The hypothesis findings can thus be summarised as follows (Table 4.23 ) 
 








Established Nascent Established Nascent Established Nascent
Escalation of Commitment P 1 y y 1 y
Planning Fallacy r 1 r y 1 1
Illusions of Control y 1 1 P 1 1
Excessive Optimism 1 1 1 1 y 1
Overconfidence1 P r r r 1 P
P Moderate to strong relationships emerged supporting the overall premise
y Minor relationships emerged supporting the overall premise
r Relationships emerged that support the overall premise but in an unexpected manner
1 No evidence was found to confirm or contradict the hypothesis
1
Overconfidence is  not indicative of predispos i tion to risk taking. However, severa l  meaningful  relationships  
emerged that may ass is t the lending decis ion process . Overconfidence does  not form part of the CRP score.












Hypothesis 1 P P 1
Hypothesis 2 r r r
Hypothesis 3 1 1 P
Hypothesis 4 1 1 1
Hypothesis 5 1 1 P
P Evidence for the hypothesis was found
r Evidence contradicting the hypothesis was found












4.13.2. Hypothesis 1 
 
The cognitive risk propensity (CRP score) will be positively correlated with the credit 
agency (Delphi score) rating 
 
At the overall population level, support for this hypothesis was found. This was most 
evident within the Escalation of Commitment bias. The Chi-Square tests indicated 
similar findings. Given the sample sizes and the abnormal Delphi Score distribution, 
no statistical significance can be read into the results. Positive correlations were 
found with regard to the Escalation of Commitment and Illusion of Control biases as 
well as the CRP score. Evidence therefore suggests that amongst the applicant 
sample group as a whole, those entrepreneurs who were more influenced by 
cognitive biases, were more likely to have poorer Delphi credit scores. 
 
Amongst the established entrepreneurs, evidence in support of this hypothesis was 
more evident for all of the cognitive biases other than the Planning Fallacy bias. This 
translated into a stronger correlation at the overall CRP level. At the nascent level, 
though all of the correlations were absent or weak, the overall CRP positive 
relationship remained. 
 
Based on these findings, it seems that behavioural finance insights can offer useful 
support to the creditworthiness assessment decision process when the associated 
lending tool is SBCS. 
 
4.13.3. Hypothesis 2 
 
Overconfidence will be negatively correlated with financial sophistication 
 
The contradictory relationship was found to be true at the overall sample and 
stratified sample levels. Evidence therefore suggests that amongst the applicant 
sample group as a whole, those entrepreneurs who were more influenced by the 
overconfidence bias, were more likely to regularly make use of financial information. 














This relationship suggests that behavioural finance insights can offer useful support 
to the creditworthiness assessment decision process when the associated lending 
tool is Financial Statement lending, though in a manner that may have been 
unexpected. 
 
4.13.4. Hypothesis 3 
 
Financial sophistication will be positively correlated with cognitive risk propensity 
(more irrational decision making) 
 
At the overall sample level and regarding the level of usage of financial information, 
negligible support was found for this hypothesis. In addition, at both the more 
established and nascent entrepreneurial levels, little support was found. Evidence 
suggests therefore that the level of usage of financial information is not dependent 
on or a driver for the extent to which entrepreneurs are influenced by the cognitive 
biases linked to ones predisposition to risk taking. As noted, the lack of normality of 
the data, and the possibility that respondents overestimated the extent to which they 
utilize financial information may have contributed to the lack of support found. 
 
Regarding the entrepreneur’s commercial numeracy skills, at the overall sample 
level, little support was found for the hypothesis. At the nascent entrepreneurial level, 
the Spearman analysis revealed a relationship between the applicants’ CRP score 
and their commercial numeracy skills. This was primarily driven by the Illusion of 
Control bias and suggests that at the nascent entrepreneurial level, those applicants 
who were more influenced by risk propensity indicative cognitive biases (particularly 
the Illusion of Control bias) were less likely to have strong commercial numeracy 
skills. 
 
This relationship suggests that behavioural finance insights can offer limited support 
to the creditworthiness assessment decision process when the associated lending 














4.13.5. Hypothesis 4 
 
Collateral dread will be positively correlated with cognitive risk propensity (more 
rational decision making) 
 
At the overall sample level and established entrepreneurial level, negligible support 
was found for this hypothesis. The findings were marginally stronger amongst 
nascent entrepreneurs though at relatively weak levels of significance. This suggests 
that entrepreneurs more influenced by the Escalation of Commitment bias may be 
more inclined to offer collateral on a loan. At the established entrepreneurial levels, 
the relationship was inconclusive. 
 
The findings suggest that behavioural finance insights can assist the 
creditworthiness assessment decision process though not as regards insights into 
predisposition to risk taking. The relationship that emerged with the Overconfidence 
bias suggests that creditworthiness assessment support is likely to be limited to 
nascent entrepreneurs. 
 
4.13.6. Hypothesis 5 
 
Collateral dread will be negatively correlated with financial sophistication 
 
At the overall sample level, negligible support was found for this hypothesis. Little 
support was found both when analysing the respondent’s level of usage of financial 
information and commercial numeracy skills. 
 
Regarding nascent entrepreneurs, minor support for the hypothesised relationship 
was evident when correlating the entrepreneur’s usage of financial information with 
their willingness to post collateral. Supporting the hypothesis, those entrepreneurs 
who were more willing to post collateral tended to make more regular use of financial 
information. No relationship was found between the nascent entrepreneur’s 













It seems that little assistance to the creditworthiness assessment decision process is 
possible in this regard since nascent entrepreneurs are not likely to be screened 










































Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
 
The constraints to SMME lending and borrowing as well as the failing of the most 
widely utilized bank lending technologies to address these constraints are briefly 
summarized.  The usefulness of Behavioural Finance and other selected alternative 
forms of creditworthiness information as a supplement to each of the most widely 
utilized bank lending technologies is affirmed as each of the findings is presented. It 
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION: CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND BANK LENDING 
TECHNOLOGIES
(The current mismatch, the bank technologies currently in use and their 
shortcomings, the potential for alternative screening technologies)
CHAPTER 2:
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE INSIGHTS IN THE CREDITWORTHINESS 
ASSESSMANT PROCESS
(Prior Behavioural Finance research within an SMME context, rational 




(Internet hosted questionnaire, measurement variables, hypotheses)
CHAPTER 4:
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
(Analysis of each of the cognitive biases and heuristics as a means to 
support the current bank lending technologies, findings of the 
hypotheses)
 - Escalation of Commitment
 - Lack of Counterfactual Thinking
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CHAPTER 5:
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is suggested that Behavioural Finance insight are relevant to the creditworthiness 
assessment process and relatively easy to accumulate. Finally, limitations to the 
study and suggestions for future research within the areas of creditworthiness and 
Behavioural Finance are detailed. 
 
 
5.2. An alternative stance on SMME finance constraints 
 
The development of the SMME sector is critical to general economic development in 
South Africa and small business funding issues have been extensively explored as 
one of the most significant constraints to progress in this area. Opinions vary as to 
whether the lack of finance available or lack of demand has been the underlying 
cause behind the lending mismatch. Financial institutions allege that creditworthy 
firms are not taking up the significant amounts of loan capital that have been made 
available, while cash constrained firms assert that they are frequently denied loans 
as they are not able to provide the financial institutions with the necessary levels of 
creditworthiness assurance. This study has recognized the presence of a mismatch 
in the SMME lending arena and highlighted the creditworthiness assessment 
process as an area that can contribute to the eventual resolution of this important 
constraint to economic development. 
 
It has been demonstrated that the three primary bank lending technologies may not 
be optimally designed to reduce the inherent uncertainty behind many SMME 
entrepreneurial venture financing decisions. Effective Small Business Credit Scoring 
relies on an informative SMME owner credit history. Effective Financial Statement 
Lending relies on the ability of the owner to provide accurate and detailed financial 
information. Effective Relationship Based Lending relies on a pre-existing 
relationship with the SMME firm or owner. A lack of information transparency is often 
found amongst more nascent entrepreneurial ventures, rendering each of these 
lending technologies ineffective. The loans to this sector are thus declined more 
often as a result of uncertainty than project riskiness. The credit demand and supply 














5.3. Research objectives  
 
The study has emphasized the inadequacies of current lending technologies when 
applied to a nascent market and proposed the usage of alternative creditworthiness 
information to assist the creditworthiness decision process. Behavioural finance 
insights were highlighted as being particularly appropriate to the SMME market since 
cognitive biases fundamentally affect the SMME entrepreneurial process. In addition, 
the study generated complementary creditworthiness indicators, these being 
financial and commercial competency, and willingness to offer collateral. 
 
The main objectives of the study were to both originate the usage of these specific 
sources of information and to then investigate whether they can be practically useful 
within the creditworthiness decision. Evidence of creditworthiness from these 
alternative sources of information was correlated with evidence of creditworthiness 
that is currently available in the marketplace. Moreover, in order to determine 
pragmatic usefulness, these alternative insights needed to be accumulated easily. 
Data was thus generated during an actual loan application process utilizing an online 
questionnaire. Finally, evidence from these alternative sources of information were 
applied to the limitations in each of the most commonly used bank lending 
technologies  The summarised shortcomings specific to each of the three lending 
technologies is presented in Table 5.1 together with the objectives of the research 
























Table 5.1. Lending technology shortcomings and findings 
 
Lending technology shortcomings and findings   
    
Lending 
Technology 
SA SMME Limitations Research Objective Key Finding 
Small Business 
Credit Scoring 
Limited applicant credit history 
will yield uninformative scores on 
many loan applicants 
Demonstrate that additional 
creditworthiness insights will 
identify more and less risky 
credit applicants 
Additional creditworthiness 
information will assist in 




SMME applicants who are unable 
or unwilling to provide financial 
information may not be 
considered regardless of actual 
entrepreneurial prospects 
Demonstrate that loan applicants 
with low financial sophistication 
are more irrational decision 
makers. 
Nascent entrepreneurs with 
less financial sophistication 
are more irrational decision 
makers. Overconfident 




Collateral demands prevent 
SMME applicants with no prior 
bank relationships from accessing 
loans 
Demonstrate that further 
insights into applicants ability 
and willingness to post collateral 
can assist the lending decision 
Willingness to offer collateral 
is an additional though minor 
indicator of risky applicants, 






Behavioural Finance insights offer pragmatically useful information in the 
creditworthiness decision process. In each of the most prominent current lending 
technologies, these insights seem to be able to assist the loan officer where reliance 
on traditional forms of information resulted in decision uncertainty. Certain of the key 
insights are summarised below. 
 
5.4.1 Behavioural Finance insights and Small Business Credit Scoring 
 
Findings of the CRP: Delphi Score correlation analyses suggested that applicants 
with a low credit rating will make less rational decisions in a commercial 
environment. This finding serves to support past research efforts where evidence of 
certain cognitive biases and heuristics was found to be correlated with a heightened 
disposition to risk taking though no findings of prior research efforts relating to 
specific biases were reconfirmed. The CRP: Delphi Score relationship was more 












extremely difficult to adequately conclude on the presence of a relationship within the 
nascent entrepreneurial sample due to the almost identical Delphi credit scores 
shared by many of the nascent applicants. Nevertheless, from the lender’s 
perspective, the possibility of accessing an additional source of information on the 
loan applicant’s creditworthiness (the applicant’s credit score) – that has been 
correlated with an externally generated and somewhat relied upon credit score – is 
an intriguing prospect. This finding is in fact particularly useful when assessing 
nascent entrepreneurs who will often have a more uninformative SBCS. The loan 
officer is then able to make a more informed decision where previously, very little 
information was available. 
 
5.4.2. Behavioural Finance insights and Financial Statement lending 
 
Overconfidence is examined as a factor behind an entrepreneur’s reluctance to 
present lending institutions with financial information. Overconfident entrepreneurs 
were found to make more regular usage of financial information. The motivation to 
withhold financial information from loan officers was analysed. Concerning 
established entrepreneurs, the incentive to provide positive information while 
withholding negative news was contrasted against the reluctance to include loan 
officers in the companies’ operations by providing only limited information. Nascent 
entrepreneurs may also be inclined to portray an overly positive financial position 
though they generally will not have the resources to present it in the prescribed 
manner. Alternatively, overconfidence in nascent entrepreneurs may indicate the will 
to prepare all of the requested financial information once the resources are 
available.. Overconfident entrepreneurs were also more likely to make rational 
decisions, while regular usage of financial information on its own was not found to be 
an indicator of rational decision making. Where reluctance to provide banks with all 
of the required financial information may have been viewed as a signal of riskiness, 
the evidence suggests that further investigation should be considered. Screening for 
evidence of the Overconfidence bias amongst established entrepreneurs may thus 















5.4.3. Alternative sources of information and Relationship Based Lending 
 
Nascent entrepreneurs less prone to the Overconfidence bias were less willing to 
post collateral. Of the more irrational decision makers, those that did not possess 
collateral were the most willing to post collateral (willing but unable). Those that had 
collateral and were willing to offer it were less influenced by cognitive biases (willing 
and able). This gives rise to a moral hazard question where an entrepreneur has no 
personal exposure when applying for a loan. Where it is evident that the 
entrepreneur is inclined to irrational decision making, the moral hazard question 
becomes more evident and the bank is able to decline the loan, bypassing the 
information asymmetry with more certainty. The relationship vindicates the inclination 
of lending only where collateral is posted (the ‘lazy bank syndrome’). However, the 
additional information may assist lending institutions seeking to reduce collateral 
demands. Where the shortness of the relationship does not allow for reduced 




5.5. Implications of the Findings 
 
The mismatch in the SMME credit market has been suggested and presented as one 
largely resulting from the reliance on inappropriate creditworthiness assessment 
technologies. It has been demonstrated that alternative sources of lending 
information may considerably reduce the limitations of these lending technologies. It 
is thus possible to improve the flow of credit between financial institutions and the 
credit constrained SMME market. Key to the usefulness of alternate sources of 
information in the creditworthiness decision is the applicability, ease and accuracy 
with which it can be generated. It is here that certain implications of the findings must 
be considered. 
 
5.5.1. Applicability of Behavioural Finance insights to creditworthiness 
 
The influence of cognitive biases is a fundamental component of the entrepreneurial 












propensity to risk taking. It may seem reasonable to assume that excessive risk 
taking will result in a greater likelihood of failing in business. Moderate propensity to 
risk taking is among the dimensions that loan officers consider interrelated to 
likelihood of success. The evidence revealed in this study substantiates the 
importance of this conviction. Certain cognitive biases – specifically Escalation of 
Commitment and Overconfidence, yielded significant correlations with the Delphi 
credit score. Chronic cognitive biases thus indicate a lack of creditworthiness. 
 
5.5.2. Ease of accumulation of Behavioural Finance insights 
 
The SBCS has been a largely successful indicator of SMME loan performance for 
several years. Financial Statement lending and Relationship based lending have 
also been effective lending technologies in larger and smaller firms respectively. 
These technologies are only effective when the information on the applicant is 
available. With regard to SBCS, an absence of loan applicant credit history is a 
severe limitation to its effectiveness. Moreover, it is impossible to create a credit 
history where there is none. In a similar vein, the applicant’s inability to produce 
financial information or lack of prior exposure to a particular financial institution are 
not easily overcome. 
 
The study has demonstrated that the accumulation of evidence regarding influence 
by cognitive biases can be performed within a commercially plausible framework. It 
is generally possible to generate data on the applicant’s propensity to irrational 
decision making within reasonable time and technology limitations. In this sense, 
Behavioural Finance insights are more accessible than the information underpinning 
the traditional lending technologies. This observation must be qualified when the 
most remotely located entrepreneurs or those without access to basic 
communication or technological devices are considered. However, the traditional 
lending technologies are also not effective within these demographics. 
 
5.5.3. Accuracy of Behavioural Finance insights 
 
Findings of the study revealed that an applicant’s susceptibility to any particular 












the tendency to irrational decision making inherent within certain applicants was not 
consistently applied in all decision case studies. This confirms that entrepreneurs are 
complex individuals faced with difficult and varied decisions. Reducing this intricacy 
to a simple score or rating with consistently accurate predictability is highly 
improbable. 
 
Moreover, the research findings revealed large variations in score when comparing 
nascent to established entrepreneurs. Certain relationships emerged at a nascent 
entrepreneurial level (e.g. Commercial Numeracy skills and the Illusion of Control 
bias) that were absent at an established entrepreneurial level. In other instances 
(e.g. the Planning Fallacy and Overconfidence biases), amongst nascent 
entrepreneurs, a positive correlation was found while the opposite was true amongst 
established entrepreneurs. This may suggest that as the entrepreneur develops, the 
approach to decision making evolves though an in depth analysis of the cause of 
these differences is beyond the scope of the study.  
 
The importance of stratifying the entrepreneurial between nascent and established 
entrepreneurs is however highlighted. The assessment of nascent entrepreneurs 
against established entrepreneurial information is a flaw of the current lending 
technologies, particularly since the nascent entrepreneur’s information is not always 
available. Effective assessment of entrepreneurial decision making is best achieved 
when contrasted against information derived from similar nascent entrepreneurial 
sources. The classification of nascent and established entrepreneurs is subject to 
judgement and the assessment of propensity to rational decision making when 
regressing this dimension against a pool of other entrepreneurs becomes a complex 
exercise. Consistent and thoughtful classification of the entrepreneurial levels and 
specific tailoring of the lending rules and expectations is likely to result in more 
informative creditworthiness scoring. 
 
 
 5.6. Contribution to the SMME lending environment 
 
The current SMME lending environment has been described as one where sufficient 












Simultaneously, the smaller firms that are credit constrained are often not able to 
access these funds. This form of credit rationing excludes both good and bad 
nascent and early stage entrepreneurs. This study is amongst the first to focus on 
the creditworthiness assessment process as a factor inhibiting the flow of credit 
between the financial institutions and SMME lenders. 
 
Moreover, the study offers a novel approach to the problem by identifying the 
potential usefulness of Behavioural Finance insights within the more established 
creditworthiness assessment methodologies. Several contributions to the fields of 
Economics and Finance have been made. 
 
5.6.1 Behavioural Finance in the credit market 
 
This study is amongst the first to link Behavioural Finance with the credit markets. 
Whilst other studies (few) have explored the presence of cognitive biases within 
credit seekers, no previous studies were found that have specifically proposed the 
identification and then harnessing of those insights within the creditworthiness 
decision. Furthermore, few studies have proposed novel approaches to the 
creditworthiness assessment process that could potentially reduce the constraints 
inhibiting the flow of credit to the SMME market, particularly those most in need of it. 
The possibility of funding good entrepreneurs where the previous lack of 
transparency precluded such an opportunity is seen as a valuable contribution. 
 
5.6.2. A new direction in SMME commerce 
 
The bulk of Behavioural Finance research has focused on decision making in capital 
markets though Behavioural Finance in SMME entrepreneurship has been amply 
researched in the past. Behavioural Finance is however still a relatively innovative 
field of exploration. Thaler (1999) stated that all future financial models will need to 
incorporate behavioural finance principles. This study is amongst the first to focus on 
the aspect of SMME financing within a Behavioural Finance framework. Lack of 
finance is often cited as amongst the most important problems in SMME 
management. Both the decision to apply for loan funding and the resulting 












examination of Behavioural Finance insights within the creditworthiness assessment 
process is thus seen as a necessary advancement to both business management 





All behavioural finance and financial sophistication related data was collected on an 
internet questionnaire platform. The various drawbacks to the utilization of internet 
based questionnaires were discussed. In addition, certain operational limitations 
regarding the length and style of the behavioural creditworthiness questionnaire that 
were imposed by the lending institution did not allow for a more detailed investigation 
using alternative research tools. The procedures employed to maximize the 
objectivity, accuracy and general utility of the data collection and analyses were 
discussed. Prior behavioural finance research indicates that given the research 
objectives of this study, the research methodology employed was suitable. 
 
While the Behavioural Finance and SMME creditworthiness principles are clearly not 
South African specific and past research in these areas spans many countries, 
country and cultural specific variables may need to be factored into the design of any 
research methodology or creditworthiness lending tool similar to that proposed in this 
study. These findings should not be assumed to be representative of entrepreneurial 
decision making practice in all or any other emerging economies. 
 
The sample size was not large enough to administer comprehensive parametric 
statistical analyses. No similar data is currently available in South Africa to bolster 




5.8. Future Research 
 
The goal of this study was to explore the potential insights that behavioural finance 












research was largely descriptive and was supported by a non-parametric correlation 
analysis utilizing data generated from loan applicants at a recognized South African 
lending institution. Certain insights that emerged seem to be pragmatically useful to 
the loan application assessment process. Other findings were inconclusive and 
deserve further clarification given their importance. Further research is thus 
proposed in the following areas: 
 The correlation between an applicant’s credit rating score and the extent to 
which cognitive biases impact the applicant’s decision making process could 
not be sufficiently demonstrated at the nascent entrepreneurial level. This 
may be primarily due to the limited credit information available to the ratings 
agencies when formulating a score. Further research into the existence of a 
relationship at the nascent level perhaps by monitoring the repayment 
performance of a sample of nascent entrepreneurs who have recently been 
granted loans would shed light on this important subject. 
 The findings that emerged indicated that behavioural insights regarding 
nascent and established entrepreneurs differ. When using predictive scoring 
tools, recommendations were made that the data pools on which the 
regression analyses are based should be segregated between these two 
entrepreneurial levels. Robust empirical testing of this finding is seen as a 
worthwhile endeavour as the revelations that emerge may strengthen the 
fields of credit risk management and predictive scoring. 
 Planning Fallacy and Lack of Counterfactual Thinking were both identified in 
past research as heuristics and cognitive biases indicative of entrepreneurial 
propensity to risk taking. Entrepreneurs more influenced by these (irrational) 
biases and heuristics are seen to be more inclined to take risks. As this 
research project was not able to successfully test for evidence of the Lack of 
Counterfactual Thinking heuristic (Paragraph 4.6), no conclusions could be 
drawn on the role it might play in future endeavours to reduce the uncertainty 
behind a creditworthiness assessment. In addition, the Planning Fallacy bias 
yielded evidence of correlations that often contradicted the relationships found 
amongst the other cognitive biases (see Paragraph 4.8.2, Paragraph 4.8.3.1, 












bias can explain these findings. Future research might further explore both of 
these variables within the creditworthiness context. 
 It was determined that overconfident entrepreneurs generally make greater 
use of financial information. Past research indicates that SMME financial 
information is often of a poor quality and distorted. Whether overconfident 
entrepreneurs distort their financial information to improve their chances of 
obtaining funding for unpromising ventures, or whether the misleading 
financial information causes entrepreneurs to become more overconfident 
was not fully explored and was beyond the scope of this study. Establishing 
the direction of causation might be useful to the creditworthiness decision and 





Behavioural Finance insights in the creditworthiness assessment process seem to 
offer opportunities for both research and practical application. Several insights have 
been developed and explored within this study. Larger sample sizes might reveal 
further insights and refute others. The fundamental usefulness of the relationships 
that emerge would however remain. Depending on the primary lending technology 
and the experience that the applicant has as an entrepreneur in the venture, 
cognitive biases and heuristics might considerably lessen the uncertainty behind a 
previously unclear creditworthiness decision. Nevertheless, within the lending 
environment, the concepts are still some time away from commercial adoption. If 
acceptance of the theories evolves into practical application, the robust tools that will 
eventually emerge may prove extremely useful in reducing the South African SMME 
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NAME OF COMPANY / CC / SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP: IP3
YEARS ACTIVELY TRADING: IP4
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES: IP5
PROFITABLE:
IP6
PRIMARY SECTOR (WHAT TYPE OF BUSINESS ARE YOU IN)
IP7
`
WHAT IS THE IDEAL SUM YOU WOULD LIKE TO BORROW IP13
WHERE ARE YOU APPLYING FOR A LOAN IP8
DO YOU HAVE ANY PERSONAL COLLATERAL: IP9
ASSUMING YOU HAVE, HOW WILLING ARE YOU TO SUPPLY COLLATERAL: IP10
VERY UNWILLING VERY WILLING

















2 partners,Vusi and Lindiwe started a call centre operation in Johannesburg 3 years ago.
Vusi's cousin in America designed their softare platform and it is still the best in the market.
Their services include outsourced default account collections and telephonic market surveys.
They have a few customers including Lindiwe's uncle and some of her business contacts.
from her previous career as a sales representative for an office furniture group.
Their company is one of the only truly BEE call centre companies in South Africa.
They are starting to get enquiries about selling their services to large groups and government
departments.
Vusi started up an outsourced cleaning company several years ago.
He was forced to close it because he locked himself into several unprofitable contracts.
Ultimately, he had priced his services too low.
Do you agree with the actions Vusi has taken below:
Initial problems with the call centre software resulted in the company losing some data on a client. As a result, they could 
not bill the customer a fair amount of work they had performed. Vusi's cousin offers to come to South Africa for a fee to try 
and retrieve the data and ensure that the problem doesn't happen again. They have not had a problem since, and they have 
a good relationship with the customer. Vusi decides it is not worth the cost and effort. LC1
The call centre agents threaten to go on strike unless they get a 10% wage increase. At his previous company, he 
remembers a strike action where he unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a lesser increase and lost several weeks of work. Vusi 
makes them an offer of 9%. LC2
Lindiwe brought to Vusi's attention the fact that Vusi sent one of their customers incorrect information about their company. 
The company will lose face if he mentions it to the customer. There is a good chance nothing will come of it. He made an 
appointment with the customer and rectified the error. LC3
A large and profitable tender appeared in the papers the previous month. It is Lindiwe's responsibility to screen the press 
for opportunities and she only noticed it after the tender had been awarded. Vusi reprimanded her severely for the missed 
opportunity. LC4
Vusi often beats himself up over the cleaning company that he had to close down. Lindiwe tells him to move on and focus 
on the future. Vusi starts to write a journal of all of the errors he feels he made at the previous company so that he can 
avoid making all of those errors again. LC5
Lindiwe discovers that Vusi made an error on the pricing of services for a customer. They are a large group who have only 
given a small section of their work to the company so far. Vusi sees this as an opportunity to get more of their work. He 
proposes to the customer that he will maintain the price if they can be awarded more of the work. LC6
Strongly agree
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Undecided Agree










Answer the following questions and then rate how sure you are that you are correct:
(Confidence:  0 = no confidence, 5 = very confident)
39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69
How many people live in South Africa? TR1
0
Between 0 (no confidence) and 5 (fully confident), how confident are you that the above answer is correct? OC1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How many different colours are there on the South African flag? TR2
0
Between 0 (no confidence) and 5 (fully confident), how confident are you that the above answer is correct? OC2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Where does South Africa currently rank in the world in terms of gold production? TR3
0
Between 0 (no confidence) and 5 (fully confident), how confident are you that the above answer is correct? OC3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How many foreign visitors came to South Africa in 2007? TR4
0
Between 0 (no confidence) and 5 (fully confident), how confident are you that the above answer is correct? OC4
KM
How many kilometres are there between Johannesburg and Nairobi? TR5
0
Between 0 (no confidence) and 5 (fully confident), how confident are you that the above answer is correct? OC5
What is the average cost of a new van in South Africa at the moment? TR6
0
Between 0 (no confidence) and 5 (fully confident), how confident are you that the above answer is correct? OC6
1 2 3 4 5
5
120,000R    160,000R    130,000R    200,000R  150,000R   
1 2 3 4
51 2 3 4
2,8862,922 3,219 2,543 2,752
1 2 3 4 5
Million
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Million











You and Alan have been partners in a tea and coffee distribution business for 1 year
You have also started roasting coffee.
The business sourced a new popular Argentinian tea product. 
They brought in 1 container so far. Your agency is not exclusive.
No credit terms have been negotiated yet. All stock must be paid for upfront.
The tea expires after 9 months.
There is export potential for all the tea brands. The first container was all exported in 1 go to 
one customer.
Do you agree with Alan's proposed course of action:
You and Alan ordered 3 containers. Since then their first customer for a whole container has decided not to take any more 
of the product for a few months. Your company will incur a 20% penalty for the value of changes on the supplier order. Alan 
wants to decrease the order? EC1
Alan bought an old coffee roaster at an expensive price. A brand new one that can roast twice as quickly has just come onto 
the market for a limited time for less than you paid. At the moment the old machine is coping. Alan wants to buy the new 
machine. EC2
Alan invested some extra start up money in a top share on the stock market. The investment has decreased by 15% so far. 
Depending who you ask, opinions vary on whether the share will bounce back or not. Alan wants to sell the shares at the 
loss and put the money back in the business. EC3
You have decided to move to new premises. You find and pay the non-refundable deposit only to discover that the cheapest 
moving quote is much more than you anticipated. Alan says he prefers the new premises. He would like to move rather than 
lose the deposit. EC4
You have been working on a new tea formula that has already taken longer than expected and occupied a lot of your time. 
Customers have not bought it as you have not got it right yet. You believe it will sell well when perfected. Alan wants you to 
put it aside and concentrate on the existing products. EC5
Your company website was designed and launched 6 months ago. You spent a reasonable amount designing the site and 
putting in all of the e-commerce facilities. So far it has hardly generated any sales. Alan wants to add extra features to 
improve the usability and look. EC6
Strongly agree
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Undecided Agree











Linda is the Managing Director of an armed guarding security company based in Cape Town.
The company has been trading for 2 years.
It was recently fully BEE accredited and may secure the contract to guard several hospitals.
Linda requires a R2 million facility from a bank.
For this contract, he must hire 500 guards and buy 500 uniforms and radios
The contract starts in 3 months
Answer the following questions as if you were an advisor to Linda.
Linda must choose between applying for 2 tenders next month. He will have a 35% chance of winning tender A that will 
yield R1,5 million profit per year and a 65% chance of winning tender B that will yield R400,000 profit a year. He has 
elected to apply for tender B. Do you agree with him? EO1
Linda believes that the advances in technology are making radios and other guarding technology cheaper. Linda is very 
upbeat about these trends as he feels his company will benefit from cost savings in the future and become more profitable. 
Linda wants to employ a senior technology expert to research new security systems. Do you agree with him? EO2
Linda has an opportunity to get his radios for 20% cheaper, but he has to order 800 at a time. He has applied for other 
tenders that will be judged in a few months. Should he stick with the order for 500 radios? EO3
Linda generally has a 25% chance of winning big tenders. He has been offered R1 million for some of his shares in the 
company. He has been told that this is a fair price by his banker friend. He will still be the majority owner. Should he 
declined the offer because he feels that if he wins a few more tenders, his shares will be worth more. EO4
Linda is one of the few truly BEE guarding businesses in the country. He was advised by friends and family to always plan 3 
years ahead. He was introduced to a senior manager at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange last year. Should he fly to 
Johannesburg to discuss with him what factors to consider for a small listing? EO5
Linda will need insurance in case his company is held liable for robberies and other accidents at his customers premises. 
He can opt for reasonable cover from a new insurer which is much cheaper than the very conservative cover he has, which 
insures against all possible accidents. He has not had to claim for anything big yet. Should he stick with the old cover? EO6
Absolutely not No Not sure Yes












Harold and Peter are partners in a steel building supply manufacturer.
They bought the business 10 years ago together with machinery and designs.
Steel is becoming less fashionable & more expensive. Aluminium demand may take over.
Start-up costs in this business are quite significant.
The business has an established customer base.
Peter must voice his opinion on some of Harold's proposals at a management meeting.
As Peter, do you agree with Harold's proposed courses of action:
Harold feels that several competitors will go bankrupt with the current slowdown in the building industry. The company 
urgently needs to upgrade several machines. Harold wants to wait as he thinks he will find some bargains at bankruptcy 
auctions soon. IC1
The company often takes foreign currency forward cover on its importing of stock. Harold has worked out that the Rand 
should not weaken for the next 2 months. He does not want to take cover now to pay for next months order. IC2
Harold predicts that the demand for aluminium will exceed steel within 3 years. He correctly predicted that timber demand 
would fall a few years ago. He is not willing to invest in an aluminium plant until he has seen orders for steel dropping off 
significantly. IC3
Sales of galvanized steel always increase in the rainy season. Harold reckons that this year will be a very rainy season and 
wants to increase stock of galvanized products by 20% more than last years levels. IC4
Harold got a large window frame order on a government tender last year. He partnered with a well connected company to 
win the job. He feels the company's frames are good quality and competitively priced. He plans to retain more of the profit in 
future by tendering without the well connected company in future. IC5
Harold wants to import a new handle from an untested supplier. He has been successful before in terms of the quality he 
needed from all of his other supplier. He needs to order immediately to secure an old price before the annual increases. He 
would rather forego the old price and order samples now for testing. IC6
Strongly agree
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Undecided Agree











Jack and his sons Rob and Eric are partners in a small truck manufacturing and repair 
company. They have been trading for 4 years.
They need R3 million to secure orders for a new non-exclusive Chinese truck brand. The trucks 
will be shipped to South Africa in kit form and assembled at a workshop.
To be viable, they must be able to manufacture a truck within 2 weeks per assembler.
They have 1 qualified manufacturer and some apprentices.
They will need some new manufacturing equipment to speed up manufacturing.
They have repaired but never manufactured trucks from kit form before.
State to what extent you agree with Rob's opinion on the plans of action below:
After only receiving a R1 million bank loan, Jack tells Rob that they will have to build the trucks in half the time. He doesn't 
think it is workable and would rather stick to truck repairs. Rob thinks that with extra training and more workers, they will 
manage and wants to place the first order for kit-form trucks now. Do you agree with Rob? PF1
With the lesser loan amount, they may struggle to pay all of the current wage costs. Some of the workers are occasionally 
idle at the moment though no trucks have been received from China yet. Jack doesn't want to retrench anyone while Rob 
thinks they will manage with a few less workers. Do you agree with Rob? PF2
The Chinese manufacturing company would like to inspect their premises. They would like to come in 2 months time. Jack 
does not want to postpone them for fear of losing their confidence but the plant and machinery is not all in place. If 
everything goes to plan, the assembly plant will all be ready in time. Rob would like to tell them to rather come in 3 months 
time. Do you agree with Rob? PF3
Rob wants to focus all marketing on the local market for the first year at least. Jack wants to spend a little extra money on 
marketing to fast-track a countrywide awareness of the brand more quickly. Do you agree with Rob? PF4
They are expecting 8 trucks to arrive in 1 week. Rob has been asked to organize a launch of the 
new brand. The most imprtnat thing is that the launch must be in 3 weeks time and cannot be 
delayed any longer. He must do everything himself and will have no help from anyone else in 
the company.
Eric suggests that you launch a competition for all of the potential truck buyers in the region, arrange sponsorship of 1 truck 
from the overseas company and get the event televised. Rob would rather create a list of all potential truck buyers in the 
region, post them an invitation to a cocktail and have a 2 hour demonstration of the trucks capabilities. Do you agree with 
Rob? PF5
Jack suggest that you have pamphlets made up and advertise in a local trucking magazine. Rob would rather introduce the 
truck at Kyalami with a stunt driver followed by truck racing around the track and a cocktail party at Kyalami Castle. Do you 




Don't know but 
carry on with the 
plan Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly agree
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Undecided Agree











Floor Tiling (Pty) Ltd manufacture tiles for the lower end market.
They sell all of the products by the metre
2
.
They normally recost their products once a year and issue letters to their customers advising them.
Their most popular range is Alpino and is to be found in many RDP housing projects.
The market is very price sensitive.
You are one of the directors and are sitting in the meeting to recalculate the selling price of Alpino
Read each item and suggest the selling price of Alpino:
The raw material currently costs R50 per metre
2
. You know you will make a good profit if you sell at double the cost of the 
raw material. EX1
Labour and overhead costs work out at R30 per metre
2
. You would like to grow the market of the Alpino tiles. EX2
A major developer has told you that one of your competitors is aggresively trying to get their business. They ask you to do a 
special deal for them just for the next month. EX3
You pay a rebate to all of your major customers of 5% at the end of the year based on total sales for the year. EX4
You have been notified that the cost of raw materials is going to increase in 1 months time by an extra R5 per metre
2
. The 
cost of labour will go up in 2 months time by R5 per metre
2
. EX5
How important are each of the factors below to your decision to set the selling 
price:
Major competitors pricing FR1
Your transport costs FR2
Your raw material costs FR3
Interest rates FR4
Your service levels FR5
Your share of the market FR6
Economic factors FR7
Last years prices FR8
5
Totally 
unimportant Not important Undecided Important
Extremely 
important
1 2 3 4
R 105R 85 R 90 R 95 R 100
1 2 3 4 5
5
R 75 R 80 R 85 R 90 R 95
1 2 3 4
R 100R 70 R 75 R 80 R 90
1 2 3 4 5
5
R 70 R 80 R 95 R 110 R 120
1 2 3 4
R 120R 80 R 90 R 100 R 110










Rate the extent to which you utilize the following when the occasion calls for it:
A full-time / part-time bookkeeper FS1
A full-time / part-time accountant FS2
Written strategy plans FS3
Regular planning sessions FS4
Gut - feel about a financial decision that has to be made FS5
Computerized accounting software FS6
A business consultant FS7
Formal internal controls around debtors, creditors and stock FS8





Formal written budgets FS13
Discounted cashflows evaluations FS14
Cashflow forecasting FS15
Bank reconcilliations FS16
Formal product costing exercises FS17
Watching cash balances FS18
Reading the financial press FS19
Preparation of audited financial statements FS20
5
Never Rare Occassional Often All the time










Rate the usefulness of each of the following as financial management tools:
A full-time / part-time bookkeeper FS21
A full-time / part-time accountant FS22
Written strategy plans FS23
Regular planning sessions FS24
Gut - feel about a financial decision that has to be made FS25
Computerized accounting software FS26
A business consultant FS27
Formal internal controls around debtors, creditors and stock FS28





Formal written budgets FS33
Discounted cashflows evaluations FS34
Cashflow forecasting FS35
Bank reconcilliations FS36
Formal product costing exercises FS37
Watching cash balances FS38
Reading the financial press FS39
Preparation of audited financial statements FS40
5
Don't know what 





























Missing or inadequate data for intended purpose


















22 Change of scale













25 Horizontal response format
26 Juxtaposed scale
27 Left or right alignment
Questionnaire too long























44 Primary and recency
45 Proxy respondent
46 Recall
47 Telescope
Cultural differences
48 Cultural
